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STATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL AS AGENTS
OF POLICE REFORM
JASON MAZZONE & STEPHEN RUSHINt
ABSTRACT
State attorneys general can and should play an important role in
remedying police violations of constitutionalrights. In 1994, Congress
enacted 34 U.S.C. § 12601 to authorizethe U.S. attorney generalto seek
equitable relief against state and local police departments engaged in
patterns or practices of misconduct. The Department of Justice
("DOJ") has used this statute to reform some of the nation's most
troubled police departments. However, the DOJ has lacked the
resources to pursue more than a few cases each year, and in 2017 the
Trump administrationannounced it would no longer enforce § 12601.
In response, some state attorneys general have sought to fill the
regulatorygap. These attorneys generalclaim legal standing under the
common law doctrine of parens patriae to seek equitable relief in
federal court against police departments within their states for
violations of constitutional rights-even without any statutory
authority for their lawsuits. Allowing these cases to proceed would give
state attorneys general expansive and untapped potential as agents of
police reform, with significant implications for police practices and
accountability.
This Article provides a cautionarytale about uses of parens patriae
by state attorneys general and presents an alternative. It urges that the
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common law doctrine of parens patriae should not allow state
attorneys generalto seek equitablerelief in federal district court against
local police departments engaged in patterns of misconduct. The
Article shows that such uses of parens patriae raise numerous doctrinal
and policy concerns. Nevertheless, the Article concludes that state
attorneysgeneral are uniquely situated to provide a check on abuses by
local law enforcement and that they should be given the tools to do so.
As an alternative to using common law parens patriae, both Congress
and state legislatures should grant state attorneys general explicit
statutory authority to seek equitable relief against local police
departments. Empowering state attorneys general in this manner has
the potential to curb seemingly intractable problems of police
violations of constitutionalrights.
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INTRODUCTION

This Article considers the appropriate role of state attorneys
general in reforming local police departments. Recent events in
Chicago, Illinois, illustrate the importance and complexity of this topic.
In October of 2014, Officer Jason Van Dyke of the Chicago Police
Department ("CPD") shot and killed seventeen-year-old African
American Laquan McDonald.' In the hours after the shooting, Van
Dyke and his fellow officers claimed that McDonald had charged at
them while swinging a knife in an "aggressive, exaggerated manner,"
forcing Van Dyke to open fire in self-defense. 2 The supervisor who
reported to the scene of the shooting found the officers' account
credible and initially ruled the use of force justified.3 In the months that
followed, this shooting received minimal press coverage, and Chicago
officials resisted calls to release video recordings from that evening.'
Then, in November of 2015, a judge in Cook County, Illinois, ordered
the City of Chicago to release dash-camera footage of the shooting.'
The video showed that, contrary to claims by Van Dyke and his fellow
officers, McDonald had not charged at them.6 In fact, it appeared from
the video footage that McDonald had been walking away from the
officers when Van Dyke fired sixteen shots in fourteen seconds, killing
him.7
1. Steve Mills et al., Laquan McDonald Police Reports Differ Dramatically from Video,
CHi. TRIB. (Dec. 5, 2015, 1:25 AM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-laquan-mcdonaldchicago-police-reports-met-20151204-story.html [https://perma.cc/86YO-FHJF]; Stacy St. Clair,
Jeff Coen & Todd Lighty, Officers in Laquan McDonald Shooting Taken off Streets-14 Months
http://www.chicagotribune.com/
7:01
AM),
2016,
22,
(Jan.
Later, CHI. TRIB.
news/opinion/editorials/ct-chicago-police-laquan-mcdonald-officers-20160121-story.html
[https://perma.cc/M4EV-Q53P].
2. Mills et al., supra note 1.
3. St. Clair et al., supra note 1 (noting that Van Dyke was not taken off the streets until
fourteen months after the shooting).
4. Carol Marin & Don Mosely, Judge Orders Release of Video Showing Shooting Death of
Chicago Teen, NBC CI. (Dec. 17, 2015, 1:43 PM), http://www.nbcchicago.com/news/national4 26
1 1.html
international/Judge-to-Decide-on-Release-of-Laquan-McDonald-Video-3517
[https://perma.cc/9Y88-KN3D].
5. Id. ("Cook County Judge Franklin Valderrama told a packed courtroom Thursday the
department must reveal the dashcam footage that capture[d] the death of 17-year-old Laquan
McDonald in October 2014 at the hands of a white police officer.").
6. Jason Meisner, Jeremy Gorner & Steve Schmadeke, Chicago Releases Dash-Cam Video
of Fatal Shooting After Cop Charged with Murder, CHI. TRIB. (Nov. 24, 2015, 7:14 PM),
https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/breaking/ct-chicago-cop-shooting-video-laquan-mcdonald
-charges-20151124-story.html [https://perma.cc/6CAM-SXE5].
7. Josh Sanburn, Chicago Releases Video of Laquan McDonald Shooting, TIME (Nov. 24,
2015), http://time.com/4126670/chicago-releases-video-of-laquan-mcdonald-shooting [https://
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Protests soon erupted across the city.' Within weeks, the U.S.
Department of Justice opened an investigation into the CPD. 9 Under
34 U.S.C. § 12601, Congress had authorized the U.S. attorney general
to conduct such investigations and to seek equitable relief in federal
court against local police departments engaged in patterns of
unconstitutional behavior.10 Congress passed § 12601 in 1994, partially
in response to the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in City of Los Angeles
v. Lyons." The plaintiff in that case had been subjected to a chokehold
during a traffic stop by officers of the Los Angeles Police Department
("LAPD"). 12 Suing under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the plaintiff contended that
chokeholds violated the federal Constitution, and he sought monetary
damages as well as an injunction against future uses of chokeholds by
the LAPD. 13 The Supreme Court held that although the plaintiff could
pursue monetary damages for the injuries he suffered, Article III's
case-or-controversy requirement1 4 barred his claim for an injunction.1 5
To understand the Court's holding-and by way of background to
this Article's discussion of parenspatriaelawsuits-a brief overview of

perma.cc/ZW9Q-WFAE].
8. Mills etal., supra note 1; see also Monica Davey & Mitch Smith, Chicago ProtestsMostly
Peaceful After Video of Police Shooting Is Released, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 24, 2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/25/us/chicago-officer-charged-in-death-of-black-teenagerofficial-says.html [https://perma.cc/NZ7A-P9RK] ("[Plrotesters led clusters of police officers on
a march through the streets of Chicago's Loop, blocking intersections, chanting outside a police
station and, along a major road to the city's largest highways, unfurling a banner that cited deaths
at the hands of the police.").
9. Monica Davey & Mitch Smith, JusticeOfficials To Investigate Chicago Police Department
After
Laquan
McDonald
Case,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Dec.
6,
2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/07/us/j ustice-dept-expected-to-investigate-chicago-police-after
-laquan-mcdonald-case.html [https://perma.cc/RB5S-M4BH].
10. 34 U.S.C. § 12601 (2018). This section was previously codified at 42 U.S.C. § 14141.
Congress originally enacted this measure as part of the Violent Crime Control and Law
Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 210401, 108 Stat. 1796, 2071.
11. City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983); see Federal Responses to Police
Misconduct: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Civil & ConstitutionalRights of the H. Comm. on
the Judiciary,102d Cong. 76 (1992) [hereinafter FederalResponses to Police Misconduct Hearing]
(statement of attorney Johnnie Cochran explaining why, after Lyons, federal governmental action
was needed to remedy police misconduct).
12. Lyons, 461 U.S. at 97.
13. Id. at 98.
14. Article III provides that the judicial power of the United States "shall extend to all Cases,
in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties
made, or which shall be made, under their Authority." U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; see also 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331 (2018) ("The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under
the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.").
15. Lyons, 461 U.S. at 105.
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standing doctrine is useful. The Supreme Court has explained that to
meet Article III's case-or-controversy requirement, a plaintiff must
demonstrate that he or she "has suffered 'injury in fact,' that the injury
is 'fairly traceable' to the actions of the defendant, and that the injury
will likely be redressed by a favorable [judicial] decision."" Congress
can, by statute, create a cause of action. The Court has explained:
"Congress may create a statutory right or entitlement the alleged
deprivation of which can confer [Article III] standing to sue even
where the plaintiff would have suffered no judicially cognizable injury
in the absence of statute."" However, Congress's power in this regard
is not unlimited because the Court still insists upon a sufficient injury
to satisfy Article 111.18 It is therefore not guaranteed that a statutory
basis to sue will satisfy the constitutional requirements.19

16. Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 162 (1997) (quoting Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S.
555, 560-61 (1992)). In addition to the constitutional standing requirements, the Court has also
identified certain "prudential" concerns that limit standing in federal court. Id. at 161. These
include a ban on a litigant raising claims of third parties; the requirement that a party raise a claim
within the "zone of interests" protected by the statutory provision that is the basis for the lawsuit;
and the prohibition on "generalized grievances" such as an interest, shared by all citizens, in
making sure the government abides by a law. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984), abrogated
by Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118 (2014). Although Article
III requirements cannot be altered, "Congress legislates against the background of [the Court's]
prudential standing doctrine, which applies unless it is expressly negated." Bennett, 520 U.S. at
163. Nonetheless, Congress's ability to override prudential standing rules is not unlimited, such
that the line between Article III and the doctrine of prudential standing is far from sharp. See,
e.g., Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an EssentialElement of the Separation of Powers,
17 SUFFOLK U.L. REv. 881, 885 (1983) (discussing the lack of precision in this area and concluding
that "[p]ersonally, I find this bifurcation unsatisfying-not least because it leaves unexplained the
Court's source of authority for simply granting or denying standing as its prudence might
dictate").
17. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 514 (1975).
18. The Court made this point in Massachusetts v. Environmental ProtectionAgency:
Congress has the power to define injuries and articulate chains of causation that will
give rise to a case or controversy where none existed before. In exercising this power,
however, Congress must at the very least identify the injury it seeks to vindicate and
relate the injury to the class of persons entitled to bring suit.
549 U.S. 497, 516 (2007) (citation omitted) (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 580 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in judgment)); see also Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540,
1549 (2016) (explaining that "Article III standing requires a concrete injury even in the context
of a statutory violation" and rejecting the claim that "a plaintiff automatically satisfies the injuryin-fact requirement whenever a statute grants a person a statutory right and purports to authorize
that person to sue to vindicate that right").
19. Compare FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 21 (1998) (holding that Article III requirements
were satisfied where Congress created a broad right to obtain information about the financial
activities of political committees and the Federal Election Commission denied the plaintiff access
to the information sought), with Lujan, 504 U.S. at 578 (holding that the provision of the
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In rejecting the plaintiff's claim for an injunction, the Lyons Court
explained that private litigants lack Article III standing to pursue
equitable relief against a police department unless they can
demonstrate a substantial likelihood of future harm to themselves.2 0
Because the plaintiff could not show he was likely to be subjected to a
chokehold in the future, Article III itself barred injunctive relief. 21
"Absent a sufficient likelihood that he will again be wronged in a
similar way," the Court explained, the plaintiff was "no more entitled
to an injunction than any other citizen of Los Angeles; and a federal
court may not entertain a claim by any or all citizens who no more than
assert that certain practices of law enforcement officers are
unconstitutional." 2 2 Because past victims of police misconduct will
rarely be able to demonstrate that they personally are likely to be
victimized by factually similar misconduct again in the future, Lyons
effectively barred the vast majority of private litigants from seeking
equitable relief against police departments. Congress enacted § 12601
to ensure that at least one litigant-the U.S. attorney general acting
through the DOJ, operating under the obligation of the executive
branch to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed" 2 3 -would
have both statutory and constitutional standing 24 to pursue courtordered reform against the nation's most problematic police
departments.2 5
Endangered Species Act permitting "any person" to sue to enforce the statute was an insufficient
basis for conservation organizations to satisfy Article III standing).
20. Lyons, 461 U.S. at 95 (holding that in order to meet the case-or-controversy requirement
of Article III, private litigants seeking injunctive relief against police departments must
demonstrate an immediate "danger of sustaining some direct injury" from similar misconduct by
the police department again in the future (quoting Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 488
(1923)).
21. Id. at 111.
22. Id.
23. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
24. In contrast to private litigants, the U.S. attorney general, as part of the federal executive
branch, readily meets Article III standing requirements when suing to enforce a validly enacted
federal statute:
It is urged that it is beyond the power of Congress to authorize the United States to
bring this action in support of private constitutional rights. But there is the highest
public interest in the due observance of all the constitutional guarantees, including
those that bear the most directly on private rights, and we think it perfectly competent
for Congress to authorize the United States to be the guardian of that public interest
in a suit for injunctive relief.
United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 27 (1960) (rejecting a challenge to a federal lawsuit under
the Civil Rights Act of 1957 against local officials for interfering with voter-registration efforts).
25. Section 12601 also responded to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit's
decision that the U.S. attorney general lacked statutory authority, under federal civil rights and
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In the wake of the Laquan McDonald shooting, it was hardly
surprising that the DOJ's investigation proceeded similarly to other
investigations pursuant to § 12601. The investigation involved
interviewing over three hundred CPD employees, analyzing around
five hundred officer use-of-force cases, participating in more than sixty
ride-alongs, and extensively reviewing internal departmental
documents.26 A little over a year later, the DOJ issued its findings.
According to the DOJ, the shooting of Laquan McDonald was not an
isolated incident; the Chicago police were engaged in "widespread
[c]onstitutional abuses," including patterns of excessive use of force in
violation of the Fourth Amendment. 27 To remedy this problem, the
DOJ announced that it would seek a court order mandating significant
reforms to CPD policies and procedures.28 It appeared that Chicago
would soon become the largest municipal police department ever to
undergo court-ordered reform via § 12601.29
However, before the DOJ could finish negotiating a consent
decree with the CPD, President Donald J. Trump took office and
appointed then-Alabama Senator Jeff Sessions as U.S. attorney

other statutes, to pursue broad remedies in federal court against police departments for asserted
violations of Fourteenth Amendment rights. See United States v. City of Philadelphia, 644 F.2d
187, 189-90 (3d Cir. 1980) (holding that the attorney general, acting through the DOJ, lacked
standing to seek injunctive relief against a police department engaged in a pattern of misconduct
unless explicitly authorized by statute).
26. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL RIGHTS DIv., INVESTIGATION OF THE CHICAGO POLICE
DEPARTMENT 2 (2017) [hereinafter DOJ INVESTIGATION OF CHICAGO POLICE DEPARTMENT],

https://www.justice.gov/opa/file/925846/download [https://perma.cc/3NMD-4PBJ].
27. Jon Seidel, Andy Grimm, Lynn Sweet & Mick Dumke, Justice Dept. Finds Widespread
Constitutional Abuses by Police, CHI. SUN TIMES (Jan. 13, 2017, 7:17 PM),
https://chicago.suntimes.com/2017/1/13/18322939/justice-dept-finds-widespread-constitutionalabuses-by-police [https://perma.cc/JS34-H74Y]; see also DOJ INVESTIGATION OF CHICAGO
POLICE DEPARTMENT, supra note 26, at 1-4 (providing an initial synopsis of the DOJ's major
findings).
28.

DOJ INVESTIGATION OF CHICAGO POLICE DEPARTMENT, supra note 26, at 16 (stating

the DOJ will seek a court order); Fran Spielman, Emanuel Agrees To Negotiate Consent Decree
8:57 PM),
13,
2017,
(Jan.
TIMES
Never Happen, CHI. SUN
That May
https://chicago.suntimes.com/2017/1/13/18391695/emanuel-agrees-to-negotiate-consent-decreethat-may-never-happen [https://perma.cc/8QE9-TB6A] (discussing how Mayor Rahm Emanuel
reached an agreement with the DOJ to negotiate a consent decree).
29. BRIAN A. REAVES, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CENSUS OF STATE AND LOCAL LAW
ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES, 2008, at 14 (2011) [hereinafter REAVES, LAW ENFORCEMENT

CENSUS], https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/csllea08.pdf [https://perma.cc/T7HX-Y6XH]
(showing that in 2008, Chicago had the second-most sworn officers of any department in the
country, behind only New York); Stephen Rushin & Griffin Edwards, De-Policing,102 CORNELL
L. REV. 721, 777-79 (2017) (showing all other police departments to have undergone federal
intervention via § 12601).
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general.3 0 Sessions quickly announced that the DOJ would no longer
use its authority under § 12601 to reform local police departments,
including the CPD.3 1 For a brief time, it seemed that the CPD had
narrowly avoided a court-ordered reform process. Following Sessions's
announcement, however, then-Illinois Attorney General Lisa Madigan
filed a lawsuit in federal district court against the CPD under § 1983,
along with several state law causes of action.3 2 The lawsuit asserted that
the CPD had engaged in "a repeated pattern of using excessive force,
including deadly force, and other misconduct that disproportionately
harms Chicago's African American and Latino residents" and it sought
broad injunctive relief. 33 The parties resolved the case a year later by
entering a 236-page consent decree requiring the CPD to implement
dozens of reforms.3 4
When the DOJ brought its lawsuit against the CPD in federal
court, it could safely rely upon § 12601 as the basis for statutory and
Article III standing. However, § 12601, which only authorizes the
"Attorney General [of the United States]" to seek equitable relief
against local police departments, does not authorize any comparable
action by state attorneys general." Section 1983, which makes state
actors who violate the federally protected rights of "any citizen of the

&

30. Eric Lichtblau, Jeff Sessions, as Attorney General, Could Overhaul Department He's
Skewered, N.Y. TIMEs (Nov. 18, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/19/us/politics/jeffsessions-donald-trump-attorney-general.html
[https://pcrma.cc/38Z4-EKT5]
(describing
President Trump's appointment of Senator Jeff Sessions as attorney general shortly after the 2016
presidential election).
31. Memorandum from Att'y Gen. Jefferson B. Sessions to Heads of Dep't Components
U.S.
Attorneys
1-2
(Mar.
31,
2017)
[hereinafter
Sessions
Memorandum],
http://www.documentcloud.org/documents/3535155-Memorandum-from-Attorney-General-JeffSessions.html [https://perma.cc/7749-LLAU] ("It is not the responsibility of the federal
government to manage non-federal law enforcement agencies.... The misdeeds of individual bad
actors should not impugn or undermine the legitimate and honorable work that law enforcement
officers and agencies perform in keeping American communities safe."); see also Stephen Rushin,
Police Reform During the Trump Administration, U. ILL. L. REv. ONLINE (Apr. 29, 2017),
https//illinoislawreview.org/symposium/first-100-days/police-reform-during-thc-trump-administration
[https://perma.cc/JLU3-BLTA] ("In issuing this short memorandum, Attorney General Sessions
has signaled a drastic reorientation of federal priorities on police reform.").
32. Complaint at 1-4, Illinois v. City of Chicago, 2018 WL 3920816 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 16, 2018)
(No. 17-cv-06260) [hereinafter City of Chicago Complaint].
33. Id. at 1; see also Bill Ruthhart, Annie Sweeney & John Byrne, AG Madigan Sues To
Enforce Chicago Police Reform; Emanuel Pledges Cooperation,CHI. TRIB. (Aug. 30, 2017, 6:01
AM),
http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/politics/ct-emanucl-madigan-consent-decreemet-0830-20170829-story.html [https://perma.cc/BQ2P-PMM9].
34. Consent Decree, City of Chicago, 2018 WL 3920816 (No. 17-cv-6260) [hereinafter City
of Chicago Consent Decree].
35. 34 U.S.C. § 12601 (2018).
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United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof" liable to
their victims, similarly lacks a provision for lawsuits by state
governments.36 And no other federal statute permits state attorneys
general to sue in federal court under § 1983. In bringing her lawsuit,
Madigan thus asserted a different source of standing: the parenspatriae
doctrine.37 Under this common law doctrine, courts have permitted
state attorneys general to file suits in federal court under federal law
even absent clear statutory authorization so as to protect the state's
quasi-sovereign interests-generally defined as preventing or
remedying a harm that affects a substantial portion of the state's
population without an adequate means of redress through private
lawsuits.38 Madigan contended that police misconduct in Chicago
satisfied all of the elements for the state to assert parens patriae as a
basis for standing, arguing that the misconduct by Chicago police
implicated the "health and well-being of Illinois residents-both
physical and economic."39 This harm, Madigan contended, affected a
"substantial segment of the residents of the State of Illinois."' And
absent action by her office, Madigan argued, "Chicago residents will
continue to be subjected to unconstitutional policing practices and, as
a result, will incur medical expenses that the state will pay."4 1 Thus,
even though no federal statute explicitly gave the Illinois attorney
general standing to pursue equitable relief against the CPD in federal
court, Madigan asserted that the doctrine of parens patriae impliedly
gave her office a right to sue, both under federal and state law, when
police officers violate federal constitutional rights-and therefore
statutory and constitutional standing requirements were met.
Madigan was not the first state official to assert parens patriae
standing to seek a remedy for police misconduct in federal court. For
example, in a small number of previous cases, state attorneys general

36. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2018).
37. City of Chicago Complaint, supra note 32, at 4-6 (laying out a standing claim via the
parens patriaedoctrine).
38. Romualdo P. Eclavea, Annotation, State's Standing To Sue on Behalf of its Citizens, 42
A.L.R. Fed. 23, § 29(a) (1979); see also infra Part II.A (describing the origins and prior uses of
the parenspatriae doctrine).
39. City of Chicago Complaint, supra note 32, at 5.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 6.
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in Pennsylvania4 2 and New York4 3 have invoked parenspatriaeto seek
consent decrees against local police departments in federal court.
Many scholars have argued that this sort of court-ordered reform is an
effective and important method to overhaul America's most troubled
police departments." After all, the DOJ itself has made effective use
of court-ordered equitable relief under § 12601 to transform many of
the nation's largest police departments, including those in Los Angeles,
Seattle, Washington, D.C., Cincinnati, Cleveland, Baltimore,
Pittsburgh, and New Orleans, as well as smaller agencies like that in
Ferguson, Missouri.4 5 Further, research shows that political
considerations influence the DOJ's own willingness to utilize its
authority under § 12601;" the DOJ uses § 12601 more aggressively
during Democratic presidential administrations than during
Republican administrations.4 7 State attorneys general seem well
positioned to pursue broad-scale relief against police departments
when the DOJ is unwilling to act. On this theory, invocation of parens
patriae should satisfy the requirements of Article III standing, and
absence of a federal statute specifically authorizing states to sue should
not stand in the way of needed police reform.
If Madigan's understanding of the parens patriaedoctrine proves
correct and widely applicable, it could radically reshape the world of
42. See Pennsylvania v. Porter, 659 F.2d 306, 314-17 (3d Cir. 1981) (en banc) (per curiam)
(concluding that Pennsylvania had standing to seek injunctive relief against the police department
in the Borough of Millvale).
43. New York v. Town of Wallkill, No. 01-Civ-0364 (CM), 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13364, at
*22 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 16, 2001) (determining that the New York attorney general had standing to
seek equitable relief against the Wallkill Police Department).
44. STEPHEN RUSHIN, FEDERAL INTERVENTION IN AMERICAN POLICE DEPARTMENTS 9497 (2017) [hereinafter RUSHIN, FEDERAL INTERVENTION] (arguing that the introduction of
federal intervention via § 12601 (then § 14141) represents one of the most important
developments in the history of police regulation); Barbara E. Armacost, OrganizationalCulture
and Police Misconduct, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 453, 457 (2004) (calling § 12601 (then § 14141)
one of the most "promising legal mechanism[s]" for reducing officer misconduct); William J.
Stuntz, The Political Constitution of Criminal Justice, 119 HARV. L. REV. 781, 789-99 (2006)
(praising the importance of § 12601 (then § 14141)).
45. Rushin & Edwards, supra note 29, at 777-79 (listing these as cities targeted for federal
intervention via § 12601).
46. Stephen Rushin, StructuralReform Litigation in American Police Departments,99 MINN.
L. REV. 1343, 1408 (2015) [hereinafter Rushin, Structural Reform Litigation] ("[T]he federal
government only has the resources to pursue SRL in a small fraction of the municipalities where
there appears to be a pattern or practice of misconduct.").
47. Stephen Rushin, Federal Enforcement of Police Reform, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 3189,
3228-35 (2014) [hereinafter Rushin, FederalEnforcement of Police Reform] (describing shifts in
enforcement of § 12601 as presidential administrations and corresponding DOJ policy have
changed).
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police oversight-particularly during periods when the federal
government takes a hands-off approach, as it has during the Trump
administration. If successful, Madigan's approach would allow state
attorneys general far-reaching authority to utilize the federal courts to
combat patterns of police wrongdoing without the need for Congress
or even the states to enact legislation authorizing these kinds of
lawsuits. In essence, state attorneys general across the country could
take up a role traditionally played by the DOJ.
The prospect of state attorneys general suing their own state's
police departments and governing municipalities in federal court to
remedy violations of federal constitutional rights raises a number of
pressing questions: What role can state attorneys general serve in
promoting effective police reform within their own state? Should state
attorneys general, though lacking federal statutory standing, have
authority under the parens patriae doctrine sufficient to satisfy the
requirements of Article III so as to seek equitable relief in federal court
against police departments engaged in unlawful behavior? If so, why
have more attorneys general not followed Madigan's lead-and are
they likely to do so in the future? Despite the importance of these
issues, they have generated very little commentary and analysis.'
This Article offers a comprehensive assessment of efforts by state
attorneys general to reform their own local police departments through
lawsuits in federal court. It concludes that although there is an urgent
need to continue efforts to reform police departments engaged in
misconduct, application of the parenspatriaedoctrine to the context of
police reform raises a multitude of doctrinal and public policy
concerns. Therefore, absent statutory authority, the parens patriae
doctrine should not grant state attorneys general blanket authority to
48. Two prior works have addressed somewhat similar questions but in different ways.
Amelia C. Waller authored an insightful student note in 1982 arguing for an expansion of the
parens patriae doctrine to the context of police reform. See generally Amelia C. Waller, Note,
State Standing in Police-Misconduct Cases: Expanding the Boundaries of Parens Patriae, 16 GA.
L. REv. 865 (1982). This Article, of course, reaches a different conclusion about how best to
empower state attorneys general. More recently, Samuel Walker and Morgan Macdonald have
made a strong argument in favor of states passing their own statutes that mirror § 12601. Walker
and Macdonald do not consider the parens patriae doctrine or the significance of federal
legislation to give state attorneys general standing in federal district court. See generally Samuel
Walker & Morgan Macdonald, An Alternative Remedy for Police Misconduct: A Model State
"Patternor Practice" Statute, 19 GEO. MASON U. C.R. L.J. 479 (2009). This Article takes up the
problems that an expansive approach to parenspatriaestanding presents in the context of police
reform while offering an alternative mechanism to empower state attorneys general-issues that
take on new significance given the pullback by the Trump administration and renewed interest at
the state level in reform efforts.
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seek equitable relief in federal district court against their local police
departments for violations of constitutional rights. Instead, this Article
argues, both Congress and state legislatures should provide state
attorneys general explicit statutory authority to pursue equitable relief
in federal court against local police departments engaged in patterns of
unlawful misconduct. An unambiguous grant of standing through
federal and state statutes, consistent with the requirements of Article
III, is far more preferable than reliance upon the vagaries of common
law parenspatriae.
Statutory authorization would bring at least two significant
benefits. First, it would result in state attorneys general more
aggressively and systematically overseeing- their local police
departments, thereby filling an important gap in the existing regulatory
framework. Some lower federal courts have approved efforts by state
attorneys general to pursue equitable relief against local police
departments under the parenspatriae doctrine, but there remains very
limited appellate precedent on the issue. The one federal circuit court
decision approving such parens patriae standing is an en banc Third
Circuit case from 1981 that generated a sharp dissent.49 The dissenting
judges took issue with the very idea that victims of police misconduct
in virtually any city constitute a sufficiently large cross section of the
state population to justify parens patriae standing." They also
concluded that existing federal laws like 42 U.S.C. § 1983 already
empower private litigants to receive relief, thereby reducing the need
for action by the state attorney general under the doctrine." Given the
uncertainty surrounding the application of parens patriae to policereform cases, it is understandable that few state attorneys general have
expended the limited resources they have to litigating these sorts of
cases. By explicitly empowering state attorneys general to pursue these
cases under state and federal law, lawmakers could eliminate this
uncertainty and likely increase the willingness of state attorneys
general to pursue police reform. Many of the existing regulatory
responses to police misconduct have proven ineffective at constraining
police wrongdoing.52 With appropriate statutory powers, state
attorneys general could play a critical role in improving police
49. Pennsylvania v. Porter, 659 F.2d 306 (3d Cir. 1981) (en banc) (per curiam). For a detailed
discussion of this case, see infra Part I.C.
50. See infra notes 257-70 and accompanying text.
51. See id.
52. For a description of the existing regulatory mechanisms and their limitations, see infra
Part I.A.
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departments across the country through the use of court-ordered
reform in a manner that comports with the requirements of Article III.
Second, insisting that Congress and state legislatures statutorily
authorize federal lawsuits by state attorneys general prevents parens
patriaefrom becoming a runaway vehicle for unconstrained structuralreform litigation.53 Existing laws provide startlingly few details on the
kinds of evidence state attorneys general must put forth to secure
equitable relief against a local police department under the parens
patriaedoctrine.54 There is also no mechanism in place to prevent state
attorneys general from asserting authority under parenspatriaein cases
that may actually conflict with federal efforts to reform police
departments under § 12601.11 Requiring a statutory basis for a state
attorney general to sue gives lawmakers at both the state and federal
level much-needed opportunities to determine in advance things such
as evidentiary requirements, standards of proof, available remedies,
and oversight mechanisms. Legislative action promotes an effective
role for state attorneys general within the existing regulatory
framework." More generally, the approach this Article urges
represents a healthy interaction between federal and state
governments in securing federal constitutional rights. Congress would
specify when state attorneys general are able to sue in federal court to
correct police violations of constitutional rights. Within these
parameters, each state legislature would decide on the scope of power
its own state attorney general would hold and exercise-with the
understanding that the alternative could be intrusive investigations and
lawsuits by the DOJ or other federal actors. A federal governmental
role can promote base-level uniformity in safeguards against abusive
police practices while a role for state government permits tailoring in
light of local experiences and conditions. Viewed from a different
direction, the approach this Article recommends also serves the
separation-of-powers values that underlie Article III's standing
requirements.57 The Article's approach requires that the federal
political branches signal a green light before the federal courts are

53. For a discussion of the basis for this concern, see infra Part III.A.2.
54. See infra Part III.A.1.
55. See infra Part III.A.2.
56. See infra Part III.A.3.
57. See Clapper v. Amnesty Int'l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 408 (2013) ("The law of Article III
standing, which is built on separation-of-powers principles, serves to prevent the judicial process
from being used to usurp the powers of the political branches.").
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available for state governments seeking themselves to enforce federal
law.
The approach offered in this Article requires lawmakers to take
additional steps before state attorneys general may seek equitable
relief in federal court against local police departments. Legislative
action is never certain, but the Article's proposal has a reasonable
chance of success. It responds to the strong, current calls for remedying
police misconduct in a way that empowers state governmental actors
rather than only federal executive officials. Accordingly, the proposal
could well result in state attorneys general taking on a significant role
in overseeing local police practices, forever reshaping the field of police
accountability.
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I explores the historical
approach to regulating local police behavior and the emergence of
equitable relief as a tool to reform the nation's most troubled police
departments. Part II evaluates the history and purpose of the parens
patriaedoctrine in order to assess its usefulness for police reform. Then
Part III explains why granting state attorneys general standing under
parenspatriae to remedy police misconduct raises some serious policy
concerns and offers some alternative normative recommendations for
empowering state attorneys general to reform local police
departments.
I. THE HISTORY OF POLICE REFORM AND AVENUES FOR
EQUITABLE RELIEF

This Part explores the historical responses to police misconduct
and the emerging interest in the use of equitable relief by state
attorneys general against local police departments within their own
jurisdiction. Section A describes the traditional mechanisms used to
regulate police misconduct and their shortcomings, which result
principally from the decentralized nature of law enforcement in the
United States and the difficulties of incentivizing police departments
to implement reforms. As detailed in Section B, the failure of
traditional mechanisms to curb misconduct led Congress in 1994 to
pass 34 U.S.C. § 12601, which grants the U.S. attorney general statutory
authority to seek equitable relief against state and local police
departments engaged in patterns of unlawful misconduct. However, as
explained in Section C, the Trump administration's refusal to enforce
§ 12601 has left police-reform advocates searching for new ways to
respond to patterns of misconduct in America's most troubled police
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departments. Section D describes how some state attorneys general
have responded to these sorts of regulatory gaps by asserting the
common law parens patriaedoctrine as a basis for standing to pursue
equitable relief in federal court in a manner that parallels the DOJ's
specific authority under § 12601.
A. Avenues for Reforming Police Departments
There are around eighteen thousand state and local police
departments in the United States, each operating with considerable
autonomy. We are not a nation with a single police force but one with
thousands of decentralized law enforcement agencies each tasked with
establishing its own goals, policies, and procedures.59 For much of
American history, state and federal policymakers did little to regulate
these dispersed agencies.' In fact, policymakers did not even consider
police misconduct a serious, widespread problem until the early
twentieth century. 61 Experts point to the release of the Report on
Lawlessness in Law Enforcement by the National Commission on Law
Observance and Enforcement ("NCLOE") in 1931 as one of the first
major recognitions of police misconduct as a "pervasive national
epidemic."62 Central to that conclusion was the vivid evidence the
report provided of police departments throughout the United States
engaged in abusive interrogation tactics known as the "third degree."63
In the years since the NCLOE report, "no fewer than six national
commissions" have also documented misconduct in police departments
across the country."4
These reports have also revealed other key facts about police
misconduct. For one thing, misconduct is not spread evenly across all
police departments. Rather, some agencies engage in significantly
more misconduct than others.65 Numerous studies have also shown
differences in victim profiles. Members of racial minority groups are

58.
59.

REAVES, LAW ENFORCEMENT CENSUS, supra note 29, at 2.
RUSHIN, FEDERAL INTERVENTION, supra note 44, at 5.

60. Id. at 8-9 (describing this as the "Hands-Off Era").
61. Id. at 9 ("The responsibility of regulating police misconduct during this Hands-Off Era
fell almost entirely on the states and localities.").
62. Id.
63. Id. at 32.
64. Michael S. Scott, Progress in American Policing? Reviewing the National Reviews, 34
LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 171, 172 (2009).
65. RUSHIN, FEDERAL INTERVENTION, supra note 44, at 32-33 (identifying Los Angeles and
New Orleans as two cities with particularly high rates of misconduct).
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significantly more likely to be impacted by abusive police activities.'
Additionally, police misconduct disproportionately affects individuals
with prior criminal records, including those convicted of felonies; these
victims may also have lost the right to vote and so lack power to seek
protection through normal democratic channels.
Studies further
demonstrate that even when police misconduct generates widespread
attention and calls for change, reform can be elusive because it often
requires municipalities to reallocate scarce resources from other local
needs like schools, parks, and infrastructure.? Thus, the fight against
police misconduct frequently boils down to a single challenge: How do
we get police departments engaged in systematic misconduct "to adopt
costly and sometimes politically unpopular reforms aimed at
preventing misconduct that primarily affects a politically marginalized
minority of the population?" 69
Three traditional mechanisms to address police violations of
constitutional or other rights have involved civil lawsuits by victims
using § 1983, exclusion of evidence in criminal trials, and prosecution
of individual officers. These mechanisms operate as "cost-raising
misconduct regulations," in that they increase the costs borne by police
departments when officers engage in misconduct, but they do not
actually force departments to make costly procedural changes aimed at
curbing future wrongdoing.70 Additionally, these mechanisms
primarily respond to individual acts of wrongdoing by police officers,
but they do not address the organizational roots of misconduct. 71 As a

66. Joseph Goldstein, Judge Rejects New York's Stop-and-Frisk Policy, N.Y. TIMES (Aug.
12, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/13/nyregion/stop-and-frisk-practice-violated-rightsjudge-rules.html [https://perma.cc/9WX5-5NX2] (describing high numbers of Black and Latino
individuals unlawfully stopped and frisked by NYPD); Oliver Laughland, Jon Swaine & Jamiles
Lartey, US Police Killings Headedfor 1,100 This Year, with Black Americans Twice as Likely To
Die, GUARDIAN (July 1, 2015, 7:48 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/jul/01/uspolice-killings-this-year-black-americans
[https://perma.cc/07G6-74DV] (describing high
numbers of Black individuals killed by police officers).
67. See Felon Voting Rights, NAT'L CONF. STATE LEGISLATURES (Dec. 21, 2018),
http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/felon-voting-rights.aspx
[https://perma.cc/UF34-225Q] (describing the limitations placed on voting rights for those
convicted of criminal offenses).
68. Rushin, StructuralReform Litigation,supra note 46, at 1408-09 (describing the high costs
of police reform and how some communities have had to make tough budgetary choices to meet
these financial demands).
69.

RUSHIN, FEDERAL INTERVENTION, supra note 44, at 8.

70. Rushin, FederalEnfbrcement of Police Reform, supra note 47, at 3196.
71. See generally Armacost, supra note 44 (discussing at length the linkage between
organizational culture and police misconduct).
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result, these traditional responses to police misconduct have proven
inadequate.
First, Congress has authorized private litigants under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 to seek civil damages, and in some cases equitable relief, against
state governmental agents -including

police officers-who violate

their constitutional or other federally protected rights. Section 1983
provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of
Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the
United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action
at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress .... 72
Congress originally enacted this statutory measure as part of the
Civil Rights Act of 1871,"7 but until fairly recently, courts took a limited
view of its applicability. In 1961, the U.S. Supreme Court in Monroe v.
Pape74 ruled for the first time that the "under color of" law language of
§ 1983 gave private individuals the right to bring a lawsuit against a
government actor in his or her official capacity even if the challenged
conduct was not actually authorized by state or local law." The Monroe
Court also held that plaintiffs did not need to avail themselves of state
law and state court remedies prior to suing under § 1983.6
Subsequently, in Monell v. Department of Social Servicesn7 and its
progeny, the Court further held that private litigants may use § 1983 to
hold municipalities responsible for the actions of their employees,
provided that the municipality was deliberately indifferent in its failure
to train or oversee its employees. In theory, civil litigation under

72. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2018).
73. Civil Rights Act of 1871, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13, 13 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983).
74. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
75. Id. at 184 (rejecting the argument that "'under color of' state law included only action
taken by officials pursuant to state law").
76. Id. at 183.
77. Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
78. Id. at 700-01 (holding that municipalities and municipal corporations can be held liable
as "persons" under § 1983).
79. City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 392 (1989) (holding that a municipality may be
liable under § 1983 for inadequate training of employees if the "failure to train reflects deliberate
indifference to the constitutional rights of its inhabitants").
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§ 1983, or on other grounds, should incentivize police departments to
implement police reform so as to avoid costly civil judgments. In
practice, however, civil litigation has proven ineffective at stimulating
widespread reform in American police departments. For one thing,
despite Monroe and Monell, the Court has limited the ability of private
litigants to obtain punitive damages against municipal entities," and
many types of police misconduct may not create an opportunity for
recovery of significant compensatory damages. The Court has also
prohibited judgments against individual officers unless plaintiffs can
overcome qualified immunity by showing that the officer violated
clearly established law.' Some scholars have shown how
indemnification policies have had unexpected negative effects on the
ability of § 1983 litigation to serve as a deterrent to individual officers
or municipal entities.' Others have noted that the use of private
insurance by municipalities to protect themselves from § 1983 exposure
can undermine the measure's deterrent effect." And still others have
shown that municipalities do not fully internalize the costs of civil
litigation, resulting in few policy or procedural changes, even after
courts order cities to pay out substantial damages because of officer
misconduct.' All of this suggests that civil litigation is an imprecise
80. See Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30,56 (1983) (establishing the standard for punitive damages
against an individual defendant under § 1983); City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S.
247, 271 (1981) (establishing that punitive damages are not recoverable against a municipal entity
under § 1983).
81. This doctrine has developed over time. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800,818 (1982)
(establishing qualified immunity for many government officials so that plaintiffs must
demonstrate that a government agent violated clearly established law in order to recover under
§ 1983); Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 614-15 (1999) (defining clearly established law); Hope v.
Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741 (2002) (further defining clearly established law for purposes of qualified
immunity).
82. See Joanna C. Schwartz, Police Indemnification, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 885, 890 (2014)
(showing that virtually all police departments indemnify their officers, including for punitive
damages, thereby reducing the likelihood that any officer will individually bear the burden of a
civil judgment).
83. See John Rappaport, How Private Insurers Regulate Public Police, 130 HARV. L. REV.
1539, 1543 (2017) ("Liability insurance dilutes, or even neutralizes, deterrence by transferring the
risk of liability from the municipality to the insurer."); cf CHARLES R. EPP, MAKING RIGHTS
REAL: ACTIVISTS, BUREAUCRATS, AND THE CREATION OF THE LEGALISTIC STATE 93,95 (2009)
(explaining that at the time that § 1983 became available for actions against police officers, "[t]he
primary police liability insurance company, pointing to concerns about rising legal liability, had
pulled out of the market" and describing how the resultant reforms made by police departments
contributed to "legalized accountability").
84. Walker & Macdonald, supra note 48, at 495 (explaining that in some cases where a
municipality is found liable for significant § 1983 damages, the municipality may not internalize
the costs of the lawsuit because "one agency of government, the police department, commits
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mechanism for generating reform in police departments. And since it
is a mere cost-raising mechanism, civil litigation "can only raise the cost
of some types of misconduct, with the hope that a rational police
department will respond with proactive policy changes.""
Compensatory damages alone cannot actually force local police
departments to make policy or procedural reforms to curb future
wrongdoing. Although the plain language of § 1983 gives litigants an
opportunity to pursue equitable and injunctive relief-in addition to
compensatory damages-as discussed in more detail in Part I.B, courts
have significantly limited the availability of these remedies.
Second, courts have barred the admission of some evidence
obtained in violation of the Constitution. The Supreme Court adopted
the exclusionary rule "to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty
in the only effectively available way-by removing the incentive to
disregard it." 86 The Court first recognized the rule in Weeks v. United
States' and expanded it to cover action by state and local law
enforcement in Mapp v. Ohio." Empirical evidence is mixed as to
whether the exclusionary rule actually inspires police departments to
substantially change internal policies to reduce misconduct.8 9 After all,
the exclusionary rule only applies if the police obtain incriminating
evidence through a violation of the Constitution and the government
seeks to introduce that evidence at trial. The Court itself has also
carved out numerous exceptions to the exclusionary rule, thereby
abuses of rights, another agency, the city attorney's office, defends the conduct in court, and a
third agency, the city treasurer, pays whatever financial settlement results from the litigation").
For a detailed analysis of how jurisdictions pay for civil rights judgments and the influence of
these different arrangements on the deterrent effect of civil litigation, see generally Joanna C.
Schwartz, How Governments Pay: Lawsuits, Budgets, and Police Reform, 63 UCLA L. REv. 1144
(2016).
85. Rushin, StructuralReform Litigation, supra note 46, at 1355.
86. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960).
87. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914) (establishing the exclusionary rule, but
only applying the rule to federal law enforcement action).
88. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643,655 (1961) (extending the exclusionary rule to state and local
governments).
89. See, e.g., William C. Heffernan & Richard W. Lovely, Evaluatingthe Fourth Amendment
Exclusionary Rule: The Problem of Police Compliance with the Law, U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 311,
355 (1991) (arguing that the exclusionary rule influences the likelihood of police departments
implementing reforms to curb future wrongdoing); Myron W. Orfield, Jr., The Exclusionary Rule
and Deterrence:An EmpiricalStudy of ChicagoNarcotics Officers, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 1016, 1017
(1987) (finding that at least some officers in the CPD responded to the exclusionary rule by
implementing policy reforms); cf GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS
BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? 322 (2d ed. 2008) (arguing that the exclusionary rule failed to

bring about substantial change in police departments).
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lessening its usefulness as a deterrent.' More generally, critics contend
that the exclusionary rule contributes to increases in crime by allowing
dangerous and guilty suspects to go free and have called for additional
limits on its application. 91 Members of the Supreme Court have also
questioned whether the exclusionary rule remains useful.92
Third, state and federal prosecutors have the ability to bring
charges against police officers who engage in criminal behavior. Police
officers are subject to criminal prosecution for violating state criminal
statutes,9 3 and under 18 U.S.C. § 242, federal prosecutors can seek
criminal charges against state and local officials who "willfully" deprive
a person of civil rights.9 4 The threat of prosecution is a useful deterrent
in some cases, but criminal conduct represents only a small subsection
of all police misconduct. 95 A significant portion of police misconduct
may violate internal departmental policies or even the federal
Constitution but still not rise to the level of a criminal offense. Even
when officers have committed crimes, prosecution may not occur.
Federal prosecutors have limited resources to investigate and
prosecute misconduct by state and local law enforcement officers all
across the country. 96 At the local level, prosecutors are often reluctant
to bring criminal charges against police officers because they depend
90. See Carol S. Steiker, Counter-Revolution in Constitutional Criminal Procedure? Two
Audiences, Two Answers, 94 MICH. L. REv. 2466, 2504-27 (1996) (documenting the numerous
exceptions to the exclusionary rule recognized by the U.S. Supreme Court over time).
91. See, e.g., Raymond A. Atkins & Paul H. Rubin, Effects of CriminalProcedureon Crime
Rates: Mapping Out the Consequences of the Exclusionary Rule, 46 J.L. & ECON. 157, 159 (2003)
(concluding that the adoption of the exclusionary rule contributed to a statistically significant
uptick in crime rates nationally); Paul G. Cassell & Richard Fowles, Handcuffing the Cops? A
Thirty-Year Perspective on Miranda'sHarmful Effects on Law Enforcement, 50 STAN. L. REV.
1055, 1127-36 (1998) (concluding that the Court's holding in Miranda, enforced via the
exclusionary rule, contributed to a statistically significant downtick in national clearance rates,
the rate at which police close cases).
92. See, e.g., Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 598-99 (2006) (suggesting a reduced need
for the exclusionary rule in an era of increasingly professionalized law enforcement officers).
93. Rushin, Federal Enforcement of Police Reform, supra note 47, at 3202 (discussing the
possibility of criminal prosecution of police officers).
94. 18 U.S.C. § 242 (2018) (making it a federal criminal offense for state officials, including
police officers, to willfully violate an individual's constitutional rights and providing for significant
criminal penalties, particularly if the violation results in bodily harm).
95. Debra Livingston, Police Reform and the Department of Justice: An Essay on
Accountability, 2 BuFF. CRIM. L. REV. 815, 842 n.138 (1999) ("[C]riminal law standards define
'the outer limits of what is permissible in society'-not the good police practices that police
reformers aspire to institute in a wayward department." (quoting PAUL CHEVIGNY, EDGE OF THE
KNIFE 101 (1995))).
96. Rushin, FederalEnforcement of Police Reform, supra note 47, at 3203 fig. 1 (showing the
small number of cases that the DOJ had the resources to address under § 242).
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heavily on a maintaining a cooperative relationship with local
departments.' For many years, scholars have recognized that local
prosecutors cannot serve as "an effective instrument for controlling
police violence" because of their "hopeless conflict of interest."9 8 In
cases involving police officer defendants, it is also not uncommon for
prosecutors to "present exculpatory evidence to a grand jury," thereby
reducing the likelihood of a criminal indictment." Even if a case gets
to trial, juries have proven hesitant to convict police officers, even in
instances of egregious wrongdoing. 00 As a result, criminal prosecution
is not a useful tool for reforming police practices across the country.
In sum, the expansion of civil liability against officers and police
departments, the exclusionary rule, and the occasional use of criminal
prosecution may address some individual instances of police
misconduct. However, these sorts of "cost-raising misconduct
regulations will always be of limited use"101 because, in the language of
law and economics, they allow police departments to engage in a form
of efficient breach.'0 2 So long as police departments are willing to
accept the costs associated with constitutional violations-say,
increased civil liability or the possibility of evidentiary exclusion-they
remain free to permit and even encourage such violations. These
mechanisms do not directly force police departments to make
procedural or policy changes that would stop misconduct by frontline
officers. Put differently, the mechanisms generally treat police
misconduct as a "bad-apple" problem, rather than as a "rotten-barrel"

97. Alexa P. Freeman, Unscheduled Departures: The Circumvention of Just Sentencing for
Police Brutality, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 677, 719 (1996) ("Local prosecutors who ordinarily work
closely with the police face an impossible conflict of interest between their desire to maintain
working relationships and their duty to investigate and prosecute police brutality.").
98. Louis B. Schwartz, ComplaintsAgainst the Police: Experience of the Community Rights
Division of the PhiladelphiaDistrictAttorney's Office, 118 U. PA. L. REV. 1023, 1023-24 (1970).
99. Kate Levine, How We Prosecutethe Police, 104 GEO. L.J. 745, 756 (2016).
100. See Armacost,supra note 44, at 466 ("The fact that the victim is viewed as unsympathetic
and unreliable contributes to jurors' natural reluctance to brand a police officer a criminal and to
send him to prison for doing his job."); Rachel A. Harmon, Promoting Civil Rights Through
Proactive Policing Reform, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1, 9 (2009) ("[V]ictims of police misconduct often
make problematic witnesses|l and ... juries frequently believe and sympathize with defendant
officers.").
101. Rushin, FederalEnforcement of Police Reform, supra note 47, at 3196.
102. Id.
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problem reflective of organizational failures in training, oversight, and
discipline.103
With traditional regulatory mechanisms ineffective in curbing
police misconduct, Congress and state attorneys general have turned
to equitable remedies, enforced by federal courts, to impose reforms
upon police departments and to overhaul their policies and practices.
That process began in the spring of 1991 following a fateful traffic stop
in Southern California.
B.

Standing and the Push for Equitable Relief

In March of 1991, George Holliday recorded a video of Los
Angeles police officers brutally beating Rodney King without any
apparent provocation." The images shocked the nation and generated
widespread and bipartisan condemnation. 105 In the weeks and months
after this incident, the U.S. House Subcommittee on Civil and
Constitutional Rights convened a hearing on how Congress could
better prevent and respond to police brutality and other forms of
misconduct. 10 6 Many members of Congress concluded from the hearing
that existing mechanisms-namely the exclusionary rule, civil
litigation, and criminal prosecution-were inadequate.107 Multiple
subcommittee members argued that it was therefore time for Congress
to "experiment with new legal theories to reform the way police
departments conducted themselves."1 " Following recommendations
from experts,'" subcommittee members urged Congress to provide
new statutory avenues for private litigants and the U.S. attorney
103. See Armacost, supra note 44, at 455 ("[R]eform efforts have focused too much on
notorious incidents and misbehaving individuals, and too little on an overly aggressive police
culture that facilitates and rewards violent conduct.").
104. REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT COMMISSION ON THE LOS ANGELES POLICE
DEPARTMENT 3-4 (1991).

105.

See Seth Mydans, Videotaped Beating by Officers Puts Full Glare on Brutality Issue, N.Y.

TIMES, Mar. 18, 1991, at Al (describing widespread condemnation of the officers, including from

President George H.W. Bush).
106. See Police Brutality: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Civil & ConstitutionalRights of
the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong. (1991) [hereinafter PoliceBrutality Hearing].
107. Rushin, FederalEnforcement of Police Reform, supra note 47, at 3213 (describing the
subcommittee's conversation); id. at 3197-3204 (describing prior attempts to address police
misconduct).
108. Myriam E. Gilles, Reinventing StructuralReform Litigation:Deputizing PrivateCitizens
in the Enforcement of Civil Rights, 100 COLUM. L. REv. 1384, 1403 (2000).
109. See Police Brutality Hearing, supra note 106, at 54-131 (statement of ACLU Legal
Director Paul Hoffman); see also FederalResponses to Police Misconduct Hearing,supra note 11,
at 74-88 (statement of attorney Johnnie Cochran).

2020]

AGENTS OFPOLICE REFORM

1021

general to obtain equitable relief in federal district courts against
problematic police departments.1 o
New federal laws were needed because of a series of court rulings
that private litigants and the U.S. attorney general lacked standing
under existing federal civil rights statutes to pursue equitable relief
against local police departments. First, in United States v. City of
11 1 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held
Philadelphia,
that the DOJ lacked statutory authority to pursue equitable relief
against the Philadelphia Police Department ("PPD") to correct a
pattern of unconstitutional behavior.112 The DOJ's investigation had
demonstrated startling problems within the PPD:
[PPD] discourage[d] victims of abuse from complaining, suppress[ed]
evidence that inculpate[d] police officers, accept[ed] implausible
explanations of abusive conduct, harass[ed] complainants and
witnesses, prematurely terminate[d] investigations, compile[d]
reports that justify police officers' conduct regardless of actual
circumstances, refuse[d] to discipline police officers for known
violations, and protect[ed] officers from outside investigations.11 3
By way of response, the DOJ sued the PPD in federal district
court. Seeking broad equitable remedies, the DOJ argued that federal
statutory law criminalizing conspiracies to violate civil rights and the
Fourteenth Amendment itself implicitly authorized the DOJ to bring
the lawsuit." 4 The district court dismissed the complaint on the ground
that absent an express grant by Congress, the U.S. attorney general
lacked standing to sue a police department for injunctive relief to
enforce the civil rights of third parties-the victims of the officers'
conduct." The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the
dismissal,116 refusing to infer standing absent express authorization
"[J]udicial
comparable to that found in other federal statutes.

110. Rushin, FederalEnforcement of Police Reform, supra note 47, at 3213-14; cf Terence
Moran & Daniel Klaidman, Police Brutality Poses Quandaryfor Justice Dept., LEGAL TIMES,
May 4, 1992, at 9 (describing conservative opposition to these proposals).
111. United States v. City of Philadelphia, 644 F.2d 187 (3d Cir. 1980).
112. Id. at 190, 199.
113. Id. at 190.
114. See United States v. City of Philadelphia, 482 F. Supp. 1248, 1251-52 (E.D. Pa. 1979)
(describing the DOJ's complaint).
115. Id. at 1252.
116. City of Philadelphia,644 F.2d at 206.
117. Id. at 192. The court also rejected the government's argument that standing could be
inferred from the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 201 ("We hold, therefore, that the fourteenth
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assertion of the power to compel drastic and far-reaching changes in
local governments," the court wrote, "would be inconsistent with a
proper division of power in a federal system.""'s After the City of
Philadelphiacase, it appeared that unless Congress specifically gave it
standing, the DOJ could not pursue injunctive or other equitable relief
against police departments in federal court.
Second, in City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, the U.S. Supreme Court
significantly limited the circumstances under which a private litigant
could seek equitable relief against a police department.11 9 There,
LAPD officers stopped Adolph Lyons for a traffic violation and,
without any apparent provocation, seized Lyons in a chokehold that
caused him to lose consciousness and damaged his larynx.120 Alleging
violations of several federal constitutional rights, Lyons sued under
§ 1983 and sought compensatory damages for the harm he suffered and
an injunction to permanently bar the LAPD officers from
indiscriminately using these kinds of chokeholds.'21
The Supreme Court held that Lyons lacked standing under Article
III of the Constitution to pursue equitable relief in the case.'" In
reaching its decision, the Court acknowledged the heavy toll inflicted
by the LAPD's use of chokeholds.1 23 When Lyons filed his first
amended complaint, he identified ten deaths caused by the LAPD's
use of a chokehold.124 Five more such deaths occurred in the following
months. 125 Even so, the Court found that Lyons had not satisfied the
threshold requirements of Article III by alleging an actual case or
controversy sufficient to secure injunctive or equitable relief.1 26 Prior
cases had established that a plaintiff seeking equitable or injunctive
relief must show that he "'has sustained or is immediately in danger of
sustaining some direct injury' as the result of the challenged official
conduct" and required that "the injury or threat of injury . .. be both
amendment does not implicitly authorize the United States to sue to enjoin violations of its
substantive prohibitions.").
118. Id.
119. City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 105 (1983) (holding that Lyons did not have
standing because he had not established a "real and immediate threat" of future violations of his
constitutional rights).
120. Id. at 97-98.
121. Id. at 98.
122. Id. at 105.
123. Id. at 99-100.
124. Id. at 100.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 101, 105.
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'real and immediate,' not 'conjectural' or 'hypothetical."' 127 The Lyons
Court quoted Rizzo v. Goode 28 and O'Shea v. Littleton1 2 9 for the
proposition that "past wrongs do not in themselves amount to [a] real
and immediate threat of injury necessary to make out a case or
controversy."13 0 Thus, to be eligible for injunctive or other equitable
relief, Lyons needed to do more than show that a handful of police
officers engaged in a series of unconstitutional acts: he had to
demonstrate that he faced a "real and immediate threat that he would
again be stopped for a traffic violation, or for any other offense, by an
officer or officers who would illegally choke him into unconsciousness
without any provocation or resistance on his part."131
The Court concluded that it was extremely unlikely that Lyons
would "not only again be stopped for a traffic violation but would also
be subjected to a chokehold without any provocation whatsoever," and
thus Article III barred the equitable claim.132 Although this result
limited the ability of future litigants to seek equitable relief against a
police department, the Lyons court took the view that federal law
would still deter police misconduct because civil damages were
available under § 1983 and criminal prosecution of officers was possible
under § 242.133 The Court also noted that states were free to impose
more generous standing requirements to allow private litigants to seek
injunctive relief under a broader array of circumstances in state
court. 13

4

Combined, Lyons and City of Philadelphiamade it extraordinarily
difficult for any litigant-whether the U.S. attorney general or an
individual victim-to claim standing to seek equitable relief against a
police department engaged in a pattern of misconduct. Accordingly,
members of Congress concerned about police misconduct argued that
127. Id. at 101-02 (quoting Golden v. Zwickler, 394 U.S. 103, 109-10 (1969); United Pub.
Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 89-91 (1947); Md. Cas. Co. v. Pac. Coal & Oil Co., 312 U.S. 270,
273 (1941); Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 488 (1923)).
128. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976).
129. O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488 (1974).
130. Lyons, 461 U.S. at 103.
131. Id. at 105.
132. Id. at 108.
133. See id. at 112-13 ("If Lyons has suffered an injury barred by the Federal Constitution, he
has a remedy for damages under § 1983. Furthermore, those who deliberately deprive a citizen of
his constitutional rights risk conviction under the federal criminal laws.").
134. See id. at 113 ("The individual States may permit their courts to use injunctions to
oversee the conduct of law enforcement authorities on a continuing basis. But this is not the role
of a federal court, absent far more justification than Lyons has proffered in this case.").
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new federal legislative measures were essential. The first proposed
response came in the form of the Police Accountability Act of 1991.135
That measure, which would have given both the U.S. attorney general
and private litigants the power to seek equitable relief against police
departments engaged in a pattern or practice of unconstitutional
misconduct, ultimately failed to garner sufficient congressional
support. 13 6 Three years later, Congress enacted a pared-down version
of the same bill as part of the Violent Crime Control Act of 1994.137
Codified today as 34 U.S.C. § 12601, this measure has become one
of the most important tools for reforming the country's most troubled
police departments. Since its passage in 1994, the DOJ has used the
statute to investigate and reform dozens of police departments across
the country. 138 In many of these agencies, the DOJ used § 12601 to force
police departments to adopt new policies and procedures on a wide
range of issues, including officer use of force, 13 9 early-intervention and

135. Police Accountability Act of 1991, H.R. 2972, 102d Cong.
136. The measure was incorporated into the Omnibus Crime Control Act of 1991, which
failed because of a Republican filibuster. Rushin, FederalEnforcement of Police Reform, supra
note 47, at 3208. Conservative lawmakers and policing advocates argued that any measure
empowering private litigants would lead to "frivolous and expensive litigation." Id. at 3214.
137. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 210401,
108 Stat. 1796, 2071 (codified as amended at 34 U.S.C. § 12601 (2018)); see also Rushin, Federal
Enforcement of Police Reform, supra note 47, at 3214 (discussing the legislative history of 34
U.S.C. § 12601).
138. See Rushin & Edwards, supra note 29, apps. A & B, at 777-79 (listing all DOJ
investigations and settlements between 1994 and 2016).
139. See, e.g., Consent Decree Regarding the New Orleans Police Department at 14-34,
United States v. City of New Orleans, No. 2:12-cv-01924-SM-JCW (E.D. La. July 24, 2012)
[hereinafter City of New Orleans Consent Decree] (regulating use of force, canines, firearm use,
electronic control weapons, and oleoresin capsicum spray); Consent Decree at 6, United States v.
Territory of the Virgin Islands, No. 3:08-cv-00158-CVG-RM (D.V.1. Mar. 24, 2009) [hereinafter
Territory of the Virgin Islands Consent Decree] (requiring documentation of use of force
incidents); Memorandum of Agreement Between the U.S. Dep't of Justice and the City of
Cincinnati, Ohio and the Cincinnati Police Dep't 8 (Apr. 12,2002) [hereinafter Cincinnati MOA],
https://www.justice.gov/crt/memorandum-agreement-between-united-states-department-justiceand-city-cincinnati-ohio-and [https://perma.cc/K7A7-PYHU] ("The use of force report form will
indicate each and every type of force that was used, and require the evaluation of each use of
force."); Memorandum of Agreement Between the U.S. Dep't of Justice and Prince George's
Cty., Md., and the Prince George's Cty. Police Dep't 6-8 (Jan. 22, 2004) [hereinafter Prince
George's
County
MOA],
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/crt/legacy/2010/12/15/
pg-memo-agree.pdf [https://perma.cc/9KOL-D7GY] (regulating use of force involving olcoresin
capsicum spray).
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risk-management systems, 40 the handling of civilian complaints,14
officer training,142 bias-free policing,14 community policing," crisis
intervention,' 45 interrogations,1 46 promotion and evaluation, 4 7 lineup
procedure,' 6 gang-unit management, 49 and canine deployment.5 0
Various empirical studies have found that equitable relief obtained via
§ 12601 can effectively reform police departments,"' reduce a police
140. See, e.g., Joint Application for Entry of Consent Decree at 15-18, United States v. New
Jersey, No. 99-5970(MLC) (D.N.J. Dec. 30, 1999) [hereinafter New Jersey Consent Decree]
(describing the development of the management-awareness program); Consent Decree at 7, 2829, United States v. City of Steubenville, No. 2:97-cv-966 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 3, 1997) [hereinafter
City of Steubenville Consent Decree] (detailing an information system to oversee officer
behavior); Cincinnati MOA, supra note 139, at 12-14.
141. See, e.g., City of Steubenville Consent Decree, supra note 140, at 15-22 (setting out an
investigation process for civilian complaints); Consent Decree at 23-32, United States v. City of
Pittsburgh, No. 2:97-cv-00354-RJC (W.D. Pa. Feb. 26, 1997) [hereinafter City of Pittsburgh
Consent Decree] (establishing standards for a civilian complaint process).
142. See, e.g., Territory of the Virgin Islands Consent Decree, supra note 139, at 21 ("The
VIPD shall continue to maintain training records regarding every VIPD officer that reliably
indicate the training each officer has received. The training records shall, at a minimum, include
the course description and duration, curriculum, and instructor for each officer."); New Jersey
Consent Decree, supra note 140, at 24 (explaining training protocol); Prince George's County
MOA, supra note 139, at 14-18 (setting out steps to overhaul officer training).
143. See, e.g., City of Steubenville Consent Decree, supra note 140, at 31 ("The City shall
conduct regular audits and reviews of potential racial bias . . . ."); City of Pittsburgh Consent
Decree, supra note 141, at 13 ("The City shall conduct regular audits and reviews of potential
racial bias, including use of racial epithets, by all officers.").
144. See, e.g., City of New Orleans Consent Decree, supra note 139, at 60-63 ("NOPD agrees
to reassess its staffing allocation and personnel deployment, including its use of specialized units
and deployments by geographic area, to ensure that core operations support community policing
and problem-solving initiatives . . . .").
145. See, e.g., Settlement Agreement and Stipulated [Proposed] Order of Resolution at 3739, United States v. City of Seattle, No. 2:12-cv-01282-JLR (W.D. Wash. July 27, 2012)
[hereinafter City of Seattle Agreement] (establishing regulations on crisis interventions and the
creation of a crisis-intervention committee).
146. See, e.g., City of New Orleans Consent Decree, supra note 139, at 46-47 (laying out
interrogation standards).
147. See, e.g., id. at 75-77 (creating standards for the promotion and evaluation of officers).
148. See, e.g., id. at 47-48 (establishing procedures for photographic lineups).
149. Consent Decree at 47-50, United States v. City of Los Angeles, No. 2:00-cv-11769-GAFRC (C.D. Cal. June 15, 2001) [hereinafter City of Los Angeles Consent Decree] (creating gangmanagement regulations).
150. Consent Decree at 15-17, United States v. Prince George's Cty., No. 8:04-cv-00185-PWT
(D. Md. Jan. 22, 2004) [hereinafter Prince George's Cty. Consent Decree] (regulating canine
deployment and establishing reporting requirements).
151. See, e.g., ROBERT C. DAVIS, NICOLE J. HENDERSON & CHRISTOPHER W. ORTIZ, CAN
FEDERAL INTERVENTION
CONSENT
PITTSBURGH

BRING LASTING
1-6
DECREE

IMPROVEMENT

IN

LOCAL

POLICING? THE

http://archive.vera.org/sites/default/
(2005),
(surveying officers,
[https://perma.cc/Z3U9-KM6W]
files/resources/downloads/277_530.pdf
conducting focus groups, and reviewing monitor reports in order to assess the Pittsburgh consent
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department's civil exposure under § 1983,152 decrease officer uses of
force,153 and increase civilian satisfaction with law enforcement.15 4
Nevertheless, the statute has suffered from two important
drawbacks. First, the DOJ has limited resources. One study found that
in the roughly twenty-five years since § 12601 was enacted, the DOJ
has investigated an average of three or four agencies per year."' Given
that there are some eighteen thousand state and local police
departments in the United States, the DOJ has therefore annually used
its statutory investigative power to assess just 0.02 percent of all police
departments. 15 6 Further, the DOJ has only sought equitable relief
against an average of one or two police departments per year.' 7 These
figures represent a very limited use of § 12601. As one former DOJ
official remarked during an interview, "there's no way that the [DOJ]
can litigate all of the patterns and practices of police misconduct in this
decree); Joshua M. Chanin, Examining Sustainability of Pattern or Practice Police Misconduct
Reform, 18 POLICE 0. 163, 163 (2015) (acknowledging success in reforming some police
departments via § 12601 litigation, but recognizing the ongoing problem of sustainability); Joshua
M. Chanin, Negotiated Justice? The Legal, Administrative, and Policy Implications of "Pattern
or Practice" Police Misconduct Reform ii-iv, 333-35 (July 6, 2011) (unpublished Ph.D.
American
University),
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/nij/grants/237957.pdf
dissertation,
[https://perma.cc/5T7G-H7HGJ (describing the reform process across a handful of police
departments targeted for federal intervention). See generally CHRISTOPHER STONE, TODD
FOGLESONG & CHRISTINE M. COLE, POLICING Los ANGELES UNDER A CONSENT DECREE:
THE
DYNAMICS
OF
CHANGE
AT
THE
LAPD
(2009),

[https://perma.cc/J4QEhttp://www.lapdonline.org/assets/pdf/Harvard-LAPD`%20Study.pdf
LMGS] (documenting the largely successful reform process in Los Angeles).
152. Zachary A. Powell, Michele Bisaccia Meitl & John L. Worrall, Police Consent Decrees
and Section 1983 Civil Rights Litigation, 16 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL'Y 575, 575-77 (2017)
(finding a modest reduction in civil rights exposure after § 12601 interventions).
153. See, e.g., Sarah Childress, How the DOJ Reforms a Police DepartmentLike Ferguson,
PBS FRONTLINE (Mar. 4, 2015), https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/how-the-doj-reformsa-police-department-like-ferguson [https://perma.cc/56Z2LTK2] ("The resulting agreement led
to major reforms, significantly reducing the number of police shootings. . . .").
154. See, e.g., STONE ET AL., supra note 151, at 44-53 (showing the results of a survey of Los
Angeles residents during the consent decree period).
155. See Rushin, FederalEnforcement of Police Reform, supra note 47, at 3230 ("This means
that the DOJ has only formally investigated around three departments per year.").
156. See id. at 3194, 3230 (quoting from in-depth interviews with subjects who worked at DOJ
and who attributed limited DOJ interventions in part to resource constraints); see also Brandon
Garrett, Remedying Racial Profiling, 33 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 41, 100-01 (2001) (stating
that "the DOJ lacks resources" to address some serious policing problems via § 12601 actions);
Harmon, supra note 100, at 21 (explaining that both "insufficient resources devoted to structural
reform of police departments and the related absence of political commitment ... , especially on
the part of the Bush Administration" help explain the limited number of (what are now) § 12601
cases).
157. Rushin, Federal Enforcement of Police Reform, supra note 47, at 3232 fig. 3 (providing
details on the number of cases that advanced to full-scale reform over the previous two decades).
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country. There are too many policing jurisdictions for them to do
that."1 5 8 Additional resources could, of course, expand investigative
possibilities. However, the sheer number of police departments means
that even if it is able to ramp up uses of § 12601, the DOJ will likely
never be able to respond to each and every problem.
Second, politics influence the DOJ's willingness to utilize § 12601.
After President Obama took office, then-Assistant Attorney General
Thomas Perez "told a conference of police chiefs .

.

. that the Justice

Department would be pursuing [§ 12601 actions] much more
aggressively than the Bush administration.""' President George W.
Bush had said on the campaign trail that he did "not believe that the
federal government should instruct state and local authorities on how
police department operations should be conducted, [thereby]
becoming a separate internal affairs division,"160 and his administration
acted accordingly. His DOJ favored a soft approach of voluntary
technical-assistance letters. 16 1 During the Obama administration, by
contrast, the DOJ resumed the Clinton administration's practice of
using § 12601 to force police departments to agree to binding consent
decrees overseen by external monitors.1 62
When President Donald Trump took office in January of 2017,
policing experts predicted that the newly appointed attorney general,
Jeff Sessions, would again soften DOJ's use of § 12601 while continuing
to play a role in police reform as President Bush's administration did
in investigating and using voluntary technical-assistance letters. 163

158. Id. at 3230 (alteration in original).
159. Heather Mac Donald, Targetingthe Police, WKLY. STANDARD (Jan. 31,2011, 12:00 AM),
https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/weekly-standard/targeting-the-police [https://perma.cc/
342P-U58Z].
160. Eric Lichtblau, Bush Sees U.S. as Meddling in Local Police Affairs, L.A. TIMES (June 1,
2000, 12:00 AM), https://www.latimes.comlarchives/la-xpm-2000-jun-01-mn-36333-story.html
[https://perma.cc/EEM5-3QW8].
161. Rushin, FederalEnforcement of Police Reform, supra note 47, at 3234 ("The prevailing
belief was that technical assistance letters could provide departments with the necessary guidance
to reform departments locally, without expending additional federal resources monitoring
eventual reform efforts.").
162. Id. at 3232-34 (showing in Figure.3 the changes in enforcement action over time).
163. See, e.g., Jon Schuppe, What Would Jeff Sessions Mean for the Future of Police Reform
as Attorney General?NBC NEWS (Jan. 10, 2017, 4:51 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/usnews/what-would-jeff-sessions-mean-future-police-reform-attorney-general-n703886 [https://
perma.cc/5XS8-YKUJ] (speculating that although the appointment of Jeff Sessions would result
in an overall deprioritization of police reform, DOJ support for voluntary reform programs would
continue).
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Instead, as discussed in the next Section, Sessions's DOJ dramatically
reduced its oversight of local police departments in every respect.
C.

DramaticPullback of DOJ Enforcement of § 12601
After Attorney General Jeff Sessions assumed control of the DOJ

in February of

2 0 1 7 ,11

he engaged in an unprecedented pullback of

DOJ enforcement of § 12601 -even as compared to the practices of the
Bush administration. One of Sessions's first acts as attorney general
was to issue a two-page memorandum that announced, "It is not the
responsibility of the federal government to manage non-federal law
enforcement agencies"16 ' and that "[t]he misdeeds of individual bad
actors should not impugn or undermine the legitimate and honorable
work that law enforcement officers and agencies perform in keeping
American communities safe."16 6 Sessions further stated that the DOJ
would immediately begin reviewing all existing and contemplated
agreements that it had reached with local police departments during
the Obama administration. 67
In the weeks that followed, the DOJ sharply curbed federal
involvement in local police departments including those proven to have
violated constitutional rights. The DOJ sought-unsuccessfully-to
block implementation of a consent decree the Obama administration
had already entered into with the Baltimore Police Department.168 It
also announced a reversal on its signed agreement with Chicago to
negotiate a consent decree: the DOJ would no longer attempt to
reform the nation's second-largest municipal police department
despite having found, under the Obama administration, a pattern of
unlawful and unconstitutional misconduct afflicting the agency.16 9

164. Eric Lichtblau & Matt Flegenheimer, Jeff Sessions Confirmed as Attorney General,
Capping Bitter Battle, N.Y. TiMEs (Feb. 8, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/08/
us/politics/jeff-sessions-attorney-general-confirmation.html [https://perma.cc/JTM6-G79B].
165. Sessions Memorandum, supra note 31, at 1.
166. Id. at 2.
167. Id.
168. See Kevin Rector, FederalJudge Approves Baltimore Policing Consent Decree, Denying
Justice
Department
Request
for
Delay,
BALT.
SUN
(Apr.
7,
2017),
https://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/baltimore-city/bs-md-ci-consent-decreeapproved-20170407-story.html [https://perma.cc/CYV9-8XFZ] (reporting on the district court's
denial of the DOJ's motion to delay implementation of the consent decree).
169. See David Schaper, Illinois Officials Ask Courts To Order Changes in Chicago Police
Policies, NPR
(Aug.
30,
2017,
11:51
PM),
https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwoway/2017/08/30/547377201/illinois-officials-ask-courts-to-order-changes-in-chicago-policepolicies [https://perma.cc/YT5M-POVU] ("[S]ince coming into office shortly after the Chicago
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Three years after Sessions announced the new policy, the DOJ had not
opened a single public investigation against an American police
department pursuant to § 12601. This hands-off approach differs
significantly from that of the Bush administration, which eschewed
binding consent decrees but nonetheless continued to investigate and
offer voluntary assistance to police departments across country.170
Session's approach also differed from the Bush administration in
two other important respects. In August of 2017, Sessions announced
that the DOJ would reverse the Obama administration's efforts to
regulate the transfer of surplus military gear to local police
departments. 171 The next month, Sessions announced that the DOJ
would also end its years-long program, through the department's
Officer of Community Oriented Policing Services ("COPS"), of
providing voluntary, collaborative assistance to local law enforcement
agencies seeking advice on best practices in policing.17 2
The changes in DOJ policy left a large gap in the regulatory
approach to American policing. For years, the DOJ's use of § 12601,
coupled with the COPS voluntary-assistance program, secured reform
of some of the nation's most troubled police departments-albeit
subject to the limitations described above. The DOJ's recent
abandonment of its oversight efforts created an acute need for a
different actor to take the lead. As discussed in the next Part, some
state attorneys general have stepped up to fill the regulatory gap,
arguing that they themselves have standing to pursue equitable relief
against local police departments in federal court.

-

report was released, the Trump administration has taken a more hands-off approach. Attorney
General Jeff Sessions has expressed skepticism of such legally binding efforts to reform
departments and improve police-community relations.").
170. Rushin, FederalEnforcement ofPolice Reform,supra note 47, at 3228-32 fig.3 (discussing
the Bush administration's continued reliance on the statute and uses of technical-assistance
letters).
171. Tom Jackman, Trump To Restore Program Sending Surplus Military Weapons,
PM),
7:47
27,
2017,
(Aug.
PosT
WASH.
to
Police,
Equipment
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/true-crime/wp/2017/08/27/trump-restores-program[https://perma.cc/K6P8-KJNS]
sending-surplus-military-weapons-equipment-to-police
(describing Sessions' speech at the Fraternal Order of Police convention in Nashville).
172. Devlin Barrett, Justice Department Ends Program Scrutinizing Local Police Forces,
WASH. POST (Sept. 15, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/justice2 4
department-ends-program-scrutinizing-local-police-forces/2017/09/15/ee88d2e-9a3d-11e7-8 e
f1076f6d6152_story.html [https://perma.cc/27NT-NBJT] (describing how the DOJ rolled back the
voluntary-assistance program through COPS).
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D. Efforts by State Attorneys General to Reform Local Police
Departments
During the past two decades, some state attorneys general have
sought to overhaul local police departments through binding consent
decrees or memoranda of understanding.17 3 The role state attorneys
general might play in police reform has gained new significance in light
of the Trump administration's decision not to deploy § 12601. In
bringing claims in federal court against their own states' police
departments and governing municipalities, state attorneys general
confront a basic problem: On what basis do they have standing to ask
federal judges to order broad equitable remedies for police violations
of federal rights? Every plaintiff in federal court must satisfy the
standing requirements of Article III: (1) the plaintiff must have
suffered an injury in fact; (2) there must be a causal connection
between the injury asserted and the defendant's alleged misconduct;
and (3) it must be likely that a favorable judicial ruling will address the
injury complained about.174 In Lyons, recall, a chokehold victim himself
seeking an injunction against the LAPD under § 1983 did not meet
these Article III requirements. 175 State attorneys general would seem
to be in an even weaker position because neither § 1983-which gives
"citizen[s] . . . or other person[s]" a cause of action-nor any other
federal statute specifically authorizes a state attorney general to bring
claims against a police department in federal court.1 76 Recognizing this
173. Although most of these efforts have involved invocation of the parenspatriae doctrine in
federal court, some have relied exclusively on state court remedies. One example is the recent
action by California Attorney General Xavier Becerra, who reached an out-of-court collaborative
agreement with the San Francisco Police Department to overhaul the department's policies and
procedures related to officer uses of force, community policing, recruitment, hiring, and officer
accountability. See Press Release, Cal. Office of the Att'y Gen., Attorney General Becerra Takes
On
Independent Review
of San Francisco Police
Reforms
(Feb.
5, 2018),
https://oag.ca.gov/news/press-releases/attorney-gencral-becerra-takes-independent-review-sanfrancisco-police-reforms [https://perma.cc/S8NV-HS6X]. California has a unique state statute,
Cal. Civ. Code § 52.3, that, much like its federal counterpart, permits the California Attorney
General to obtain equitable and declaratory relief in California state court in cases of police
misconduct. For more than twenty years, the California Attorney General has relied on this
statute to secure through state court processes reforms of local police departments. See Anita
Chabria & Kate Irby, California Steps In To Oversee Police Reform After Trump Administration
PullS Out, SACRAMENTO BEE (Feb. 6, 2018, 6:16 PM), https://www.sacbee.com/news/local/
articlel98562044.html [https://perma.cc/TDJ-2LA3] ("In 1999, California investigated and later
sued the Riverside Police Department, settling with a consent decree to reform the agency.").
174. Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 167 (1997); see also supra note 16 and accompanying text.
175. See supra notes 20-22 and accompanying text.
176. Here, the best analysis comes from the decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit in Virginia Office for Protection & Advocacy v. Reinhard, 405 F.3d 185 (4th Cir.
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hurdle, some state attorneys general have asserted standing based on
the common law doctrine of parens patriae-whichpermits states to
sue to protect their quasi-sovereign interests, including in the wellbeing of the state's population-and have argued that it is adequate to
meet the requirements of Article III.
The most prominent recent example is from Chicago. After
Attorney General Sessions announced the DOJ would no longer use
its authority under § 12601 to reform the CPD, then-Illinois Attorney
General Lisa Madigan sued the City of Chicago, asserting claims
against its police force under § 1983, the Illinois Civil Rights Act of
2003, and the Illinois Human Rights Act. In the lawsuit, Madigan
sought broad injunctive relief to address CPD misconduct that, she
contended, disproportionately affected Black and Latino residents.1 77
Because § 1983 does not specifically give state attorneys general
authority to seek relief in federal district court, Madigan argued that
the parenspatriaedoctrine authorized her to act to protect the interests
of its residents.178 Madigan claimed that the interests that provided a
basis for standing included the "health and well-being.. . both physical
2005). That court held that a state agency is not a "person" entitled to bring a lawsuit under § 1983.
Id. at 190. The court's analysis combined plain meaning analysis, statutory construction, and
legislative history. The court wrote:
The word "person" in a federal statute generally includes "corporations, companies,
associations, firms, partnerships, societies, and joint stock companies, as well as
individuals." At the same time, the Supreme Court has held that "person" should
generally not be construed to include the sovereign. . . . [Tihe presumption that
"person" does not include the sovereign may be overcome only by an "affirmative
showing of statutory intent to the contrary."
Id. at 189 (citations omitted) (quoting Vt. Agency of Nat. Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens,
529 U.S. 765, 781 (2000)). As to the possibility of statutory intent, the court explained that the
state "has not presented us with, and we are not aware of, any affirmative evidence of statutory
intent to allow suits by sovereigns under § 1983 that would overcome the general presumption
that 'person' in a statute does not include the sovereign." Id. at 190. Indeed, the statutory history
cuts the other way, because § 1983 "was enacted most specifically to help enforce the Fourteenth
Amendment rights of the persecuted to equal protection under the laws" and there exists "no
affirmative indication that Congress sought to protect the rights of sovereign entities as well." Id.
The court viewed the Supreme Court's Will decision as providing additional support for its
analysis:
Will established that Congress did not intend for "person" in § 1983 to include the
sovereign for purposes of determining who may be sued. And, a term is presumed to
have the same meaning throughout a statute. Indeed, that presumption is "at its most
vigorous" when the term in question is repeated in the same sentence, as it is here.
Id. (citations omitted) (quoting Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115, 118 (1994)); see also Illinois v.
City of Chicago, 137 F.3d 474, 477 (7th Cir. 1998) (citing Will to conclude that a state "can be
neither plaintiff nor defendant in a § 1983 case").
177. City of Chicago Complaint, supra note 32, at 1-4 (articulating the statutory basis for the
claim, as well as the reliance on parens patriae).
178. See id. at 4-6 (elaborating on the parens patriaebasis for Madigan's claim).
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and economic" of Chicago residents who are victims of police
misconduct 79 along with the state's "quasi-sovereign interest in the
prevention of present and future harm to its residents, including
individuals who are, have been, or would be victims of the City's
unconstitutional law enforcement practices."so Further, Madigan
asserted, there were "proprietary interests" at stake given that
taxpayers pay "billions of dollars annually on health care benefits and
services for Illinois residents enrolled in Medicaid," including for
nearly "1 million Chicago residents.""' In sum, Madigan claimed, "a
substantial segment of the residents of the State of Illinois" is affected
in some way by the CPD's pattern of misconduct-and that she, as
attorney general, had parens patriae standing to remedy the problem
in federal court."
These arguments were not entirely novel. On occasion, federal
courts have granted state attorneys general parens patriae standing in
cases of police misconduct. For instance, in 2001 then-New York
Attorney General Eliot Spitzer successfully invoked parens patriae
standing in federal district court in an action against the Wallkill Police
Department.1 83 Spitzer alleged that officers of the Wallkill Police
Department "routinely and openly used their powers to target women,
critics, and perceived enemies of the Department, by making traffic
stops without having reasonable suspicion to do so and by committing
various acts of harassment, all in violation of the federal and state
law."" The court agreed that the state had standing in the case. It
concluded that New York, represented by Spitzer, had a "strong quasisovereign interest in protecting law-abiding New Yorkers (including
especially women) from systemic, unlawful, discriminatory and
retaliatory police tactics carried out with official knowledge and
sanction."' The court also reasoned that the alleged pattern of
misconduct affected a sufficiently large segment of the populationpotentially all motorists and women in the community-to justify legal

179. Id. at 5.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 6.
182. Id. at 5.
183. New York v. Town of Wallkill, No. 01-Civ-0364 (CM), 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13364, at
*2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 16, 2001).
184. Id.
185. Id. at *3.
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action by the state.'8 6 Further, the court emphasized, standing was
proper because the Lyons decision had made it "exceedingly difficult"
for any private litigant to bring a similar claim in federal court.1xs
There is some obvious appeal in allowing a state attorney general
to reform, through federal litigation, police departments that violate
federal constitutional rights-particularly if the DOJ is not willing to
act. Nonetheless, there remains a question whether, in the absence of
statutory authority to sue, state attorneys general should be able to
proceed under the doctrine of parens patriae. The next Part explores
that question by examining the history and limits of the parenspatriae
doctrine in order to assess its benefits and risks in cases involving police
misconduct.
II. THE LIMITS OF PARENS PA TRIAE STANDING

To understand whether courts should interpret the parenspatriae
doctrine to allow state attorneys general standing to seek equitable
relief against police departments in their jurisdictions, it is useful to
consider the history and purpose of the doctrine. Historically, parens
patriaestanding has been a powerful basis on which state governments
have brought lawsuits to remedy problems that could not otherwise be
addressed by private litigants. In recent decades, courts have facilitated
these kinds of lawsuits by expanding the contours of parens patriae
standing. States, in turn, have made frequent use of the doctrine in state
and federal court to protect their environments,ss safeguard
consumers,'1 89 remedy discriminatory employment practices,190 sue

186. Id. at *7, *13-17 (discussing why the suit served to prevent "injury to a ... substantial
segment of the population" (omission in original) (quoting New York v. 11 Cornwell Co., 695
F.2d 34, 39 (2d Cir. 1982))).
187. Id. at *18-21 (discussing why Lyons and other cases have substantially limited the ability
of private litigants to bring suits seeking similar relief).
188. See, e.g., California v. Auto. Mfg. Assoc. (In re Multidistrict Vehicle Air Pollution
M.D.L. No. 31), 481 F.2d 122, 131 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1045 (1973) (involving states
using parenspatriaestanding in an antitrust action stemming from an agreement to refrain from
developing pollution-control devices for automobiles); State v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 126 A.3d 266,
275, 289 (N.H. 2015) (involving the state seeking damages for environmental contamination on
behalf of state citizens through parens patriaestanding).
189. See, e.g., Edmond v. Consumer Prot. Div. (In re Edmond), 934 F.2d 1304, 1309-13 (4th
Cir. 1991) (considering a parenspatriaeaction involving the Maryland Consumer Protection Act).
190. See, e.g., New York v. Peter & John's Pump House, Inc., 914 F. Supp. 809, 811-16
(N.D.N.Y. 1996) (involving a state asserting parens patriae standing to challenge racial
discrimination in hiring).
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tobacco companies,' 91 and, in some cases, curb abusive police
practices.192
State attorneys general marching to court to vindicate the rule of
law might seem like a good thing -and a contrast to a long history of
states themselves being sued for violating individual liberties.
However, parens patriae standing comes with considerable concerns.
This Part discusses those concerns with a particular focus on state
attorneys general asserting parens patriae standing in lawsuits against
their own cities in federal court to remedy police misconduct. It begins,
in Section A, with a brief summary of the origins and contemporary
features of parens patriae standing. Section B then considers the
problems with granting parens patriae standing in the absence of a
statutory grant. Section C provides a detailed synopsis of how the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, the only federal appellate court
thus far to consider the issue, applied the parens patriae doctrine to
permit a state attorney general to seek equitable relief against a local
police department-and the cautionary tale that decision provides.
A.

History and Elements of Parens Patriae Standing

In a parens patriae action, the state sues in its sovereign capacity
and is the named plaintiff in the lawsuit. The concept of parens patriae
originates in the royal prerogative: the powers of the King, as "father
of the country," to act on behalf of individuals lacking the legal capacity
to protect themselves.1 9' In the U.S. system, courts have long
recognized parens patriae as a common law power of state legislatures.
As the Supreme Court has explained:
This prerogative of parenspatriae is inherent in the supreme power of
every State, whether that power is lodged in a royal person or in the
legislature [and] is a most beneficent function . . . to be exercised in

191. See, e.g., Texas v. Am. Tobacco Co., 14 F. Supp. 2d 956, 971 (E.D. Tex. 1997). The court
in this case defended the use of parenspatriae:
In the Court's opinion, [parenspatriae as] a basis for suit has long been available to the
State. . . . In this case, the State has simply dusted off a long recognized legal theory
and seeks to use it to further the purposes of the statutes in question and right the
alleged wrongs involved in this matter.
Id.
192. See supra Part I.D.
193. See Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 405 U.S. 251, 257 (1972) ("Traditionally, the term
was used to refer to the King's power as guardian of persons under legal disabilities to act for
themselves.").
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the interests of humanity, and for the prevention of injury to those
who cannot protect themselves.' 94
Separate from that legislative power, modern courts have created
a common law doctrine of parens patriae standing. 19 5 Such standing
allows the state to sue to redress an injury to its "quasi-sovereign"
interests.1 " The Supreme Court has described that interest as "a
judicial construct that does not lend itself to a simple or exact
definition."1 97 According to the Court, "quasi-sovereign" interests that
give rise to state standing in court "consist of a set of interests that the
State has in the well-being of its populace" and "are not sovereign
interests, proprietary interests, or private interests pursued by the State
as a nominal party." 198 That is to say, in aparenspatriaeaction, the state
is not simply representing private citizens. Instead, the Court has
explained:
In order to maintain such an action, the State must articulate an
interest apart from the interests of particular private parties, i.e., the
State must be more than a nominal party. The State must express a
quasi-sovereign interest. Although the articulation of such interests is
a matter for case-by-case development-neither an exhaustive formal
definition nor a definitive list of qualifying interests can be presented
in the abstract -certain characteristics of such interests are so far
evident. These characteristics fall into two general categories. First, a
State has a quasi-sovereign interest in the health and well-beingboth physical and economic-of its residents in general. Second, a
State has a quasi-sovereign interest in not being discriminatorily
199
denied its rightful status within the federal system.

194. Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 600 (1982)
(alteration in original) (quoting Mormon Church v. United States, 136 U.S. 1, 57 (1890)).
195. See, e.g., New York v. New Jersey, 256 U.S. 296, 302 (1921) (holding that New York had
parens patriae standing to sue to enjoin the discharge of sewage into the New York harbor);
Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 239 (1907) (holding that Georgia had standing to sue
to enjoin the discharge of fumes from a Tennessee copper plant); Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S.
208, 248 (1901) (finding that Missouri had parens patriae standing to sue Illinois and a Chicago
sanitation district on behalf of Missouri citizens to enjoin the discharge of sewage into the
Mississippi River).
196. Alfred L. Snapp & Son, 458 U.S. at 601.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 602. On the standing of states to sue in a proprietary or sovereign capacity,
including to enforce state laws, see Ann Woolhandler & Michael G. Collins, State Standing, 81
VA. L. REV. 387, 446-78 (1995).
199. Alfred L. Snapp & Son, 458 U.S. at 607.
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As to the first of these two categories, the Supreme Court "has not
attempted to draw any definitive limits on the proportion of the
population of the State that must be adversely affected by the
challenged behavior." 2 0 But it has said that "more must be alleged than
injury to an identifiable group of individual residents" and that "the
indirect effects of the injury must be considered as well in determining
whether the State has alleged injury to a sufficiently substantial
segment of its population."2 01 In making this assessment, the Court has
observed, "[o]ne helpful indication ... is whether the injury is one that
the State, if it could, would likely attempt to address through its
sovereign lawmaking powers."20 In other words, the harm should be
general enough that it would attract the attention of lawmakers. As to
the second interest, the Court has said that the state is entitled to act as
parens patriae to "ensur[e] that the State and its residents are not
excluded from the benefits that are to flow from participation in the
federal system," including unimpeded access to interstate commerce
and to the benefits of federal statutory regimes.203
In early years, state parens patriae lawsuits typically involved
claims for injunctive relief.20 However, states now regularly also seek
monetary damages through such suits.2 05 Depending on the nature of
the claim and underlying state laws, the state may distribute the
proceeds of these lawsuits to individuals or retain them in the state
treasury.20 6 Not surprisingly, many parenspatriaelawsuits are brought
against private parties. Those brought against other government
entities have typically involved lawsuits that cross state lines to address
the activities of a sister state.20 7 Parens patriae lawsuits in which one
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 608.
204. See, e.g., Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208, 216 (1901) (involving a parens patriaeclaim by
Missouri seeking an injunction against the discharge of sewage into the Mississippi River by the
sanitary district of Chicago); People v. Tool, 86 P. 224, 225-26 (Colo. 1905) (involving a parens
patriaeclaim for an injunction to prevent election fraud).
205. See, e.g., State v. LG Elecs., Inc., 340 P.3d 915, 916-17 (Wash Ct. App. 2014) (involving
a parens patriaeclaim for damages under a state consumer-protection law); State v. Hess Corp.,
20 A.3d 212, 214 (N.H. 2011) (involving a parens patriae claim for damages for groundwater
contamination).
206. See Susan Beth Farmer, More Lessons from the Laboratories:Cy Pres Distributionsin
Parens Patriae Antitrust Actions Brought by State Attorneys General, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 361,
391-405 (1999) (discussing the disposition of proceeds from parenspatriae antitrust cases).
207. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553, 581 (1923); Kansas v.
Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 47 (1907); Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. at 208-09.
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part of a state sues another part of that same state -such as the state
suing one of its cities-appear to be comparatively rare. 208 Finally, it
bears mentioning that some courts have insisted that parens patriae
standing "requires a finding that individuals could not obtain complete
relief through a private suit," 2 0 but, as discussed in further detail

below, the precise meaning of that requirement is not always clear.210
The Supreme Court's 1982 decision in Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc.
v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez 211 illustrates many of the aspects of a parens
patriae lawsuit and the broad contours of the modern doctrine. In
Snapp, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico sued Virginian apple
growers in federal court.212 Asserting standing as parens patriaefor
Puerto Rican migrant farmworkers, the Commonwealth of Puerto
Rico alleged violations of the federal Wagner-Peyser Act, the
Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, and associated implementing
regulations.2 13 These laws operated to give U.S. workers, including
citizens of Puerto Rico, an employment preference over temporary
foreign workers so as to ensure that the working conditions of domestic
employees were not adversely affected by employment of foreign
workers and to prohibit discrimination against U.S. employees.2 14
Puerto Rico alleged that the defendants had 787 job openings for
temporary farm labor to pick the 1978 apple crop in Virginia, and they
had violated federal law by hiring foreigners over Puerto Rican
migrant farmworkers and by subjecting the Puerto Rican workers they
did employ to more burdensome employment conditions than those
applied to the temporary foreign workers.215
208. Nearly a century ago, the Supreme Court held that states lack power to sue the federal
government in parens patriae. See Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 485 (1923) ("It cannot
be conceded that a state, as parens patriae, may institute judicial proceedings to protect citizens
of the United States from the operation of the statutes thereof."); cf Massachusetts v. EPA, 549
U.S. 497, 520 (2007) (holding that Massachusetts had constitutional standing to challenge the
EPA's failure to promulgate regulations under the federal Clean Air Act, stating that because of
procedural protections Congress itself had created and "Massachusetts' stake in protecting its
quasi-sovereign interests," the state was "entitled to special solicitude in our standing analysis").
209. New York v. 11 Cornwell Co., 695 F.2d 34,40 (2d Cir. 1982), vacated in part, 718 F.2d 22
(2d Cir. 1983) (en banc).
210. See Massachusetts v. Bull HN Info. Sys., Inc., 16 F. Supp. 2d 90, 101 (D. Mass. 1998)
("This 'requirement' is no more than another formulation of the general parens patriae standing
consideration that the state be more than a nominal party in a private dispute.").
211. Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592 (1982).
212. Id. at 597.
213. Id. at 594-95.
214. Id. at 595-96.
215. Id. at 597-98.
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Puerto Rico sought declaratory and injunctive relief.21 6 The
district court held that while Puerto Rico, like states, may assert parens
patriae interests, it lacked standing in the case against the Virginia
apple growers because of the small number of individuals involved787 workers out of a total population of nearly three million-and the
minimal impact upon Puerto Rico's economy from loss of these
temporary jobs. 2 17 The circuit court reversed and the Supreme Court
affirmed that ruling.218
The Supreme Court reasoned that focusing on the 787 job
opportunities was "too narrow a view of the interests at stake." 219
Puerto Rico also had "a substantial interest in assuring its residents that
it will act to protect them from [unlawful discrimination]," and that
interest swept beyond the 787 workers involved in the particular
case. 2 20 The Court further found that Puerto Rico had an independent
interest in acting to ensure its residents were able to take full advantage
of the employment opportunities established and protected by federal
statutory law.2 21 Thus, Puerto Rico was not simply standing in for the
injured farm workers-it had broader interests in ensuring compliance
with federal law.
The Snapp Court might have followed the reasoning of the district
court and trimmed the reach of parens patriaestanding, but instead, it
endorsed a broad conception of the doctrine that gave states a green
light to litigate on this basis. At the same time, Snapp left unclear some
key aspects of the doctrine. On the facts before it, the Supreme Court
upheld Puerto Rico's right to sue, but the Court-unsurprisingly-did
not provide a precise yardstick for determining when a state has a
sufficient interest to invoke parenspatriae. In particular, Snapp did not
resolve some long-standing questions about how to calculate the
number of affected citizens for purposes of determining whether a state
has standing. In Snapp, the Supreme Court said the state had "alleged
injury to a sufficiently substantial segment of its population," 22 2 but it
did not supply a definitive test for determining when the requirement
is met. Other cases have used different terms, referring to the interests

216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id. at
Id. at

598-99.
599.
599, 610.
609.
609-10.
607.
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of "the inhabitants of a state" 2 23 or to the state protecting "all or a
considerable portion of its citizens." 224 It is not at all clear what fraction
of a population must be affected in order for the state to act. Snapp
also left open questions as to how the relevant community is to be
defined for purposes of determining the baseline. For example, is it
geography that counts? If so, is the baseline a specific locality or the
entire state? Likewise, should everyone in a defined community be
counted? Or does the relevant population only include those likely to
be affected by the activities complained about? Neither in Snapp nor
in later cases has the Supreme Court provided clarity.
From the perspective of states, the absence of well-defined limits
to parens patriae has created opportunity. Since Snapp, states have
asserted parens patriae standing in a wide array of cases in state and
federal court and under state and federal law. 225 Although not all
invocations of parenspatriae have succeeded, and thus the doctrine is
not unlimited,22 6 parens patriae has emerged as a powerful tool for
states to sue.
Given this trend, and with increased national attention on
misconduct by police officers, it is not surprising that a few state
attorneys general have turned to parens patriae as a basis for
intervening in local police departments. Indeed, invocation of parens
patriae is an almost natural development when police departments are
unwilling or unable to reform themselves and other possible forms of
external pressure-such as individual civil rights lawsuits, DOJ
interventions, or state or federal legislative measures-are either
inadequate or do not emerge. Whether attorneys general are
predisposed to take a role in police reform because they are the chief
law enforcement officers of the state or they are simply inclined to
223. Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208, 241 (1901).
224. Kansas v. Colorado, 185 U.S. 125, 142 (1902).
225. See, e.g., AU Optronics Corp. v. South Carolina, 699 F.3d 385, 391 (4th Cir. 2012)
(concluding that parenspatriae allows states to sue on behalf of citizens when the interests of a
group of citizens are at stake, so long as they are pursuing the quasi-sovereign interest of the
state); West Virginia ex rel. Morrisey v. Pfizer, Inc., 969 F. Supp. 2d 476, 492 (S.D. W. Va. 2013)
(holding that the power to sue as parenspatriaeis inherent to each state); see also infra notes 23539 (providing further examples).
226. See, e.g., Illinois v. Life of Mid-Am. Ins., 805 F.2d 763, 766 (7th Cir. 1986) (holding, in a
case in which the Illinois attorney general sued for damages asserting a violation of the federal
RICO Act and state consumer-fraud laws, that where the complaint was limited to injury suffered
by eight consumers, the state had failed to assert a quasi-sovereign interest and was merely a
nominal party lacking parens patriae standing); Sec'y of Labor v. Turnage, 657 F. Supp. 1033,
1035-36 (D.P.R. 1987) (holding that parens patriaestanding was inappropriate because the state
was seeking merely to "litigat[e] a personal claim" of one of its citizens).
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intervene to pick up the slack, state attorneys general have asserted
parens patriae standing as a basis for actions against cities. The
remainder of this Part discusses concerns that arise when state
attorneys general make use of parens patriaein this manner.
B.

Two ConcernsAbout Parens Patriae Standing

The parens patriae doctrine can be a powerful tool for state
attorneys general to access federal courts and secure relief for their
residents. But the application of this doctrine also generates significant
concerns. One concern implicates the allocation and exercise of
governmental power within a state and as between the state and federal
governments. A second concern relates to the use of parens patriaeto
expand the scope of federal statutory causes of action. These concerns
are discussed in turn.
1. Allocations of Power. When the state attorney general asserts
parenspatriaestanding and a federal court accepts that claim, there are
other governmental actors whose interests may well be implicated. At
the federal level, Congress has an interest in how litigants use, and how
courts interpret, its statutory law and in the scope of federal
jurisdiction. So too, the federal executive branch has an interest in how
federal statutory laws are used, particularly if, as in the context of
police misconduct, Congress has empowered the DOJ or another
federal entity to determine when and how such laws are enforced.
At the state level, the state legislature has an interest in litigation
pursued on the state's behalf-especially when it comes to federal
lawsuits against the state's own cities. In the context of police
misconduct, the state legislature might well prefer to address the
problem itself, through state laws, rather than have federal courts
impose remedies under federal law. Likewise, a police department or
governing municipality sued by the state attorney general in federal
court loses the opportunity to have other branches of state
government -which might be more attentive to local interestsaddress police misconduct. In many states, the attorney general is
elected. He or she might thus be of a different political party than the
governor, with different policy preferences and goals and perhaps
might even be eyeing the governor's job. Parenspatriae lawsuits to
address police misconduct thus raise the possibility that one state
executive official-the attorney general-pursues a particular remedy
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that the governor and other state executive officials oppose.22 7 State
attorneys general who sue in federal court under federal law also
bypass state courts, which may have interests in the development of
legal rules governing police conduct within their jurisdiction as well.
None of this is to say that, as a general matter, any of these other
governmental actors' interests are so pressing that they should
necessarily prevent state attorneys general from litigating in federal
court on the basis of parens patriae. For instance, a lawsuit by a state
attorney general does not prevent the state legislature or other entities
from also acting on a given issue; the attorney general's intervention
might come only after other actors have failed to do anything and there
is widespread belief that somebody should step up; and other actors
might not oppose the attorney general's lawsuit and might even have
taken affirmative steps to give it their blessing. Context obviously
matters. Still, it remains important to consider the ways in which
aggressive uses of parens patriaemight alter allocations and exercises
of governmental power.
2. Extension of FederalStatutory Claims. In the context of parens
patriaesuits involving police departments, state attorneys general have
asserted causes of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.228 Originally enacted
as part of the Civil Rights Act of 1871,229 § 1983 provides in relevant
part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of
Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the
United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the

227. See Neal Devins & Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, Fifty States, Fifty Attorneys General,
and Fifty Approaches to the Duty To Defend, 124 YALE L.J. 2100, 2143-54 (2015) (arguing that,
as evidenced by their decisions whether or not to defend challenged state statutes, elected state
attorneys general are increasingly motivated by partisan concerns).
228. Section 1983 does not itself confer federal jurisdiction. Instead, in a § 1983 suit the
sources of federal jurisdiction are 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (the general federal question statute) and 28
U.S.C. § 1343(3) (providing for federal court jurisdiction "[t]o redress the deprivation, under color
of any State law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, of any right, privilege or
immunity secured by the Constitution ... or by any Act of Congress providing for equal rights of
citizens or of all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States"). State courts have
concurrent jurisdiction over § 1983 actions. Haywood v. Drown, 556 U.S. 729, 734-35 (2009).
229. Civil Rights Act of 1871, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13.
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Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action
at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress ... .230
One familiar question that arises under § 1983 asks who counts as
a person acting under color of state law and is thus subject to liability.
On that issue, the Supreme Court has held that neither a state 23 1 nor
state officials sued in their official capacities for monetary damages are
persons subject to suit under § 1983.232 However, a state officer sued in
his or her official capacity for prospective injunctive relief is a person
subject to suit. 23 3 Cities and local governments whose customs, policies,
or practices caused a deprivation of a federal right are also persons
subject to lawsuits for damages and other remedies under § 1983.23 A
separate question is who can act as a plaintiff in a § 1983 suit. In
particular, may a state, though not a person for purposes of liability,
bring a § 1983 action? State attorneys general have persuaded some
courts that the state indeed has standing as a plaintiff even though the
state is not a person subject to § 1983 liability as a defendant.
Before turning to consider parenspatriae standing in § 1983 cases,
it bears mentioning that courts have also allowed states to proceed as
parenspatriaein cases involving other federal statutes similarly lacking
a provision authorizing states to sue. These cases have included Title

III of the Americans with Disabilities Act and § 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973;235 the anticonspiracy provisions of the Civil

230. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2018).
231. Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 67 (1989) (explaining that "in
enacting § 1983, Congress did not intend to override well-established immunities or defenses
under the common law," including "[tihe doctrine of sovereign immunity").
232. Id. at 71 (explaining that an official-capacity suit against a state officer "is not a suit
against the official but rather is a suit against the official's office... [and] is no different from a
suit against the State itself" (citation omitted)). State government officials sued in their individual
capacities are persons against whom monetary damages can be sought. Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S.
21, 31 (1991).
233. Will, 491 U.S. at 71 n.10; see also Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159-60 (1908) (explaining
that a state officer seeking to enforce an unconstitutional statute is "stripped of his official or
representative character and is subjected in his person to the consequences of his individual
conduct").
234. Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 700-01 (1978).
235. See New York v. Mid Hudson Med. Grp., 877 F. Supp. 143,146 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (holding,
in a case involving allegations of discrimination against individuals with hearing impairments, that
the state could bring a parenspatriaesuit to enforce the Americans with Disabilities Act and the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973). The Mid Hudson court explained that although it had not found any
"case[s] holding that a state has parenspatriae standing to sue under the ADA or under Section
504 ... states have frequently been allowed to sue in parenspatriaeto other [wise] enforce federal
statutes that ... do not specifically provide standing for state attorneys general." Id.
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Rights Act of 1872;236 the Fair Housing Act; 23 7 Title II of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964;238 and the Older Workers Benefit Protection Act
and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act.239 In these contexts,
as under § 1983, courts have assumed that states may invoke parens
patriae standing as a general matter and have turned quickly to the
question of whether, on the facts of the case, the doctrinal
requirements for such standing had been satisfied. Rather than
examine, as an initial matter, whether parens patriae standing is
permitted by or even consistent with the underlying statute, courts
have understood such standing as always potentially available. 24 0 By
granting state attorneys general the opportunity to move forward as
litigants under a parenspatriae theory, courts appear perfectly willing
to expand the enforcement of federal statutes-without regard for
what Congress has actually provided for in the statute or the risks
associated in stepping beyond the overall regulatory regime.

236. See New York v. 11 Cornwell Co., 695 F.2d 34, 39 (2d Cir. 1982) (holding, in a case
involving allegations that a partnership preemptively purchased a home to thwart a state agency
plan to buy and turn the property into a housing for mentally challenged citizens, that the state
had parenspatriaestanding to sue under § 1985(3)), vacated in part, 718 F.2d 22 (2d Cir. 1983) (en
banc); New York v. Operation Rescue Nat'l, No. 92 Civ. 4884 (RJW), 1993 WL 405433, at *2
(S.D.N.Y. 1993) (holding that the New York attorney general had parenspatriaestanding to seek
an injunction under § 1985(3) prohibiting pro-life protesters from presenting Bill Clinton with
fetal remains during the 1992 Democratic National Convention because "[d]efendants' actions
affect the general population by fomenting civil disobedience and by requiring extra police,
thereby imposing substantial costs in order to enforce the law against defendants"). The
anticonspiracy statute is at 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (2018).
237. See Support Ministries for Persons With AIDS v. Vill. of Waterford, 799 F. Supp. 272,
277 (N.D.N.Y. 1992) (holding, in a case involving allegations of discriminatory zoning practices
by village officials against individuals with AIDS, that the state had standing to sue in parens
patriae under the Fair Housing Act and § 1983 because "the State has alleged an injury to its
quasi-sovereign interest in the health and well-being of its citizens").
238. See New York v. Peter & John's Pump House, Inc., 914 F. Supp. 809, 813 (N.D.N.Y.
1996) (holding, in a case involving allegations of a commercial club's discriminatory treatment of
African American customers, that the state had parenspatriae standing under Title II of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, in part because the state was seeking broad equitable relief).
239. See Massachusetts v. Bull HN Info. Sys., Inc., 16 F. Supp. 2d 90, 98 (D. Mass. 1998)
(holding, in an age discrimination case in which the defendant had laid off workers and sought
waivers of claims to receive severance payments, that the state had parenspatriae standing under
the Older Workers Benefits Protection Act and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
because "[t]he subject matter of this litigation implicates the general well-being of the
Commonwealth's residents" in that "[djiscrimination of any kind, whether based on age, race or
handicap, corrodes the social fabric and fosters intolerance and inequality").
240. See, e.g., New York v. Utica City Sch. Dist., 177 F. Supp. 3d 739,747-49 (N.D.N.Y. 2016)
(holding that the New York attorney general had standing under parens patriae to pursue
equitable relief against a school district that allegedly denied immigrant students with limited
English-language skills the opportunity to enroll in high school).
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Although courts have generally understood parens patriae
standing broadly, it remains unclear just how far this doctrine ought to
extend and whether it should apply in police-reform cases. Only one
federal appellate court has considered whether the parens patriae
doctrine grants state attorneys general authority under § 1983 to seek
equitable relief against a local police department for violations of
federal constitutional rights. The next Section examines that decision
and the lessons it provides for assessing future efforts by state attorneys
general to address police misconduct.
C.

Parens Patriae and Police Reforn

The only federal appellate court that has considered the
application of parens patriae to a police-reform case is the Court of
241
Porter
Appeals for the Third Circuit in Pennsylvania v. Porter.
involved a § 1983 suit by the Community Action Unit of the Office of
the Pennsylvania Attorney General against the Borough of Millvale
and the borough's police department, mayor, council, police chief, and
a police officer in connection with alleged violations of Fourteenth
Amendment rights by the officer-defendant.2 42 The state asserted
parens patriaestanding and sought broad injunctive relief barring the
defendants from subjecting Millvale residents to unlawful searches and
seizures, unconstitutional uses of force, threats, harassment, or other
violations of their rights.243 The district court permitted the
Commonwealth to proceed as a plaintiff on the basis of parenspatriae,
and it issued the requested injunction.2 " On appeal, the circuit panel
ruled that the state lacked such standing.24 5 The court subsequently

241. Pennsylvania v. Porter, 659 F.2d 306 (3d Cir. 1981) (en banc).
242. Id. at 310.
243. Id. at 310-11. It is worth noting that the state initially also claimed it could act as an
"other person" under § 1983. Id. at 327.
244. Id. at 312 & n.7 (setting out the provisions of the permanent injunction the district court
entered after trial). Several Pennsylvania district court decisions had held that a state can act as
parenspatriaeunder § 1983. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Flaherty, 404 F. Supp. 1022,1024 (W.D. Pa.
1975) (holding that Pennsylvania was permitted to act as a § 1983 plaintiff in a case involving a
city's alleged racially discriminatory employment practices for police officers), vacated on other
grounds, 760 F. Supp. 472 (W.D. Pa. 1991); Pennsylvania v. Glickman, 370 F. Supp. 724, 727-28
(W.D. Pa. 1974) (similar holding in case involving firefighters). But c.f Pennsylvania ex rel.
Rafferty v. Phila. Psychiatric Ctr., 356 F. Supp. 500, 506 (E.D. Pa. 1973) (rejecting parenspatriae
standing in a § 1983 case involving a discharged nurse's due process and First Amendment suit
against a state and federally funded psychiatric center on the ground that "[tihe public interest
claimed here is ... too remote to be encompassed by the doctrine of parenspatriae").
245. Porter, 659 F.2d at 327 (Garth, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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granted rehearing en banc. 2 ' The en banc court affirmed the trial
court's decision that parenspatriaestanding applied and mostly upheld
the injunction.247
In his majority opinion, Judge Gibbons conceded that
Pennsylvania was not a "person" under the language of § 1983; instead,
he focused on the "Commonwealth's sovereign interests," beginning
with what he called the "occasionally neglected fundamental" principle
that the Fourteenth Amendment is "the supreme law of the land in all
of Pennsylvania" and "[a]ll executive officers of Pennsylvania,
including the Attorney General, have taken the [constitutional]
oath ... to uphold that amendment." 21 Further, Gibbons wrote,
Pennsylvania is "vitally interested in safeguarding the health and safety
of individuals in its territory." 249 Gibbons explained that under state
law, "the attorney general is the officer responsible for vindicating [all
of] the[se] sovereign interests" and, in so doing, is not required to "rely
upon the happenstance of suits by individual victims of constitutional
violations." 250 In its lawsuit, then, Pennsylvania was "advancing
significant sovereign interests of its own in the prevention of future
violations of constitutional rights of its citizens, in circumstances in
which it cannot reasonably anticipate that private enforcement will
achieve the protection of those sovereign interests." 251
Judge Gibbons next offered four additional points to shore up his
conclusion that the state had standing. First, he observed, a parens
patriae lawsuit is not unusual. He wrote that that the "[a]ctions by a
government for the prevention of harm to interests shared by all
members of the community are no strangers to the federal law of
remedies," as evidenced by the fact that the U.S. government has
"been a frequent parens patriae plaintiff" and that "[p]arens patriae
actions by the states are also familiar federal court remedies of long
standing." 25 2 Second, Gibbons observed that lower courts in the Third
Circuit in particular "have long recognized that the Commonwealth
may bring a parens patriae action . . . to enforce the fourteenth

amendment." 25 3 Third, Gibbons invoked state law as basis for standing
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.

Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id. at
Id.
Id. at

325 (majority opinion).
314-15.
315.
316.
317.
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in the case. He explained that even if the "traditional federal law
remedy of a parens patriae action" was not available to enforce the
Fourteenth Amendment, Pennsylvania law empowers the attorney
general to bring actions to "enforce the laws of the Commonwealth,"2 54
and federal jurisdiction is appropriate where the proceeding is "in
vindication of civil rights."255 Fourth, Gibbons explained, it was no
objection that Pennsylvania could have brought a case in state court to
address the police misconduct at issue. Gibbons said that Pennsylvania
was not required to proceed in state court, and to insist that it do so
when it "seeks the aid of a federal court in assisting it in the discharge
of its freely acknowledged duty to enforce the provisions of the federal
constitution" would be a "perversion of principles of federalism."256
Writing in dissent in Porter, Judge Garth, joined by two other
members of the en banc court, set out a series of objections. Garth
began by observing that-as the state itself had concededPennsylvania was not a person under § 1983.257 He added that "[i]n so
conceding, the Commonwealth apparently recognized that a state itself
cannot seek the protection of § 1983 with respect to its own sovereign
interests."2 58 Garth thus thought the majority decision in favor of
standing had itself created a federalism problem: because § 1983
"offers redress to those who are injured under the color of state
authority," to allow a state to "bring suit, against its own
instrumentalities and against its own officers" because of "alleged
violations, under color of state law, of federal rights belonging to the
very state which is suing" would "turn[] the statute on its head."259
Garth further observed that barring a state from suing under § 1983
would not mean that states lack power to ensure governmental actors
comply with constitutional requirements. Instead, Garth explained,
Pennsylvania has "the power to regulate conduct by its municipalities
when that conduct infringes upon the constitutional rights of the
Commonwealth's citizens" even though "Congress has not gone so far
as to provide in § 1983 a . . . statutory remedy of which the state can
avail itself." 26 According to Garth, § 1983 simply did not permit the
state to sue governmental officials who violate federal rights.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.

Id. at 318 (quoting 71 PA. CONS. STAT. § 294(b) (repealed 1980)).
Id.
Id. at 319.
Id. at 327 (Garth, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id.
Id. at 327 n.3.
Id (emphasis added).
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Judge Garth then took up "the alternate ground of parens
patriaestanding also asserted by the Commonwealth" 2 61-protecting
the interests of Pennsylvania citizens. He concluded that "in this
respect as well, parens patriaestanding is not available to the
Commonwealth in this case because the Commonwealth failed to
allege and prove injury to a 'quasi-sovereign' interest affecting all its
citizenry" and instead "has sought to litigate, as a volunteer, personal
claims of its individual citizens." 26 2 According to Judge Garth, even
though courts have expanded the doctrine of parens patriae, the state
must still show two things: (1) "a widespread injury or threat which
affects, or could potentially affect, the well being of virtually all of its
citizens";2 63 and (2) because parenspatriaestanding may not be used to
"vindicate individual or personal rights . . . even when constitutional
violations are alleged,"2 6 that the injury is such that "no individual or
group of individuals could seek the same relief" 265 as could the state.
Here, Garth concluded, Pennsylvania failed on both points. As to
the first point, the harm the state had alleged was "limited to an
exceedingly small number of the Millvale community-no more than
fifty individuals.",2 6 Doing the math, Garth found that those fifty
individuals represented just ".00004% of the Commonwealth's entire
population." 2 67 This figure was insufficient for parens patriaestanding.
As to the second point, Garth concluded that ample private remedies
were available: the individual victims of the police conduct at issue had
already sued and obtained relief. 268 In his majority opinion, Judge
Gibbons took the position that the injuries suffered by individual
citizens gave rise to some broader interests on the part of the state,
including in ensuring local officials comply with constitutional
requirements and that the state not bear the costs of their failure to do
so. 26 9 On that point, Garth complained that the majority had engaged
in "attenuated logic and questionable reasoning" and that these
separate interests, though set out by Judge Gibbons, had not been

261.
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.
268.
269.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

327.
327-28.
329.
328.
330.
331.
333.
315-16 (majority opinion).
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asserted by the state itself and lacked a basis in the evidentiary
record.270
These debates between the majority and dissent in Porter
demonstrate the difficulties of parens patriae standing as a basis for
states to reform police practices. Grafting parens patriae onto § 1983
asks courts to transform a statute that provides tailored remedies to
individuals whose constitutional rights were violated by state officials
into a mechanism for states themselves to overhaul its own
governmental entities. Section 1983, recall, makes state officials who
violate the rights of "any citizen of the United States . . . or other

person ... liable to the party injured." By its very terms, therefore, the
statute creates a cause of action and a basis for recovery for individuals,
not for state governments. On the remedial side, allowing states to
assert parens patriae as a basis for obtaining injunctions under § 1983
against police departments is inconsistent with the limitation that the
Supreme Court recognized in Lyons. There, an individual victim of
police misconduct could recover monetary damages under § 1983 but
could not obtain injunctive relief because of the low likelihood the
police would violate his rights again. Parenspatriae lawsuits seek to
circumvent this limitation on the theory that because the state is
invoking the interests of the entire community or some large portion
of it, future police misconduct will affect some individuals within that
community even if it is impossible to identify those individuals in
advance. Section 1983 does allow for injunctive relief, but again, it
makes the remedy available only to those individuals whose rights have
been violated:.under the statute, it is the "party injured" who may bring
a "suit in equity." As Lyons makes clear, the statute does not
contemplate injunctions on behalf of individuals unable to show that
they are likely in the future to suffer a violation of their rights. There
might be sensible reasons for allowing states greater latitude when they
sue to protect constitutional rights. But rather than courts inferring that
states have special leeway, Congress can-and should-specify when

270. Id. at 333 (Garth, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Even Judge Garth did not
seem to entirely foreclose parens patriaestanding in a § 1983 case. He acknowledged that under
different circumstances Pennsylvania might succeed in demonstrating interests sufficient to show
parenspatriae.Id. Here, "[even if the Commonwealth had alleged all of the elements leading to
a quasi-sovereign interest which appear in the separate opinion of Judge Gibbons, it has failed to
offer evidence to prove them." Id. at 334.
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and how it wants to authorize states to serve as plaintiffs to enforce
federal statutes that safeguard the rights of individuals.27 1
None of this is to conclude that § 1983 can never be used to redress
harm to groups of individuals or to secure injunctive relief adequate to
prevent police departments from violating constitutional rights in the
future. As demonstrated by the recent successful challenge to the stopand-frisk practices of the New York Police Department, 2 72 § 1983 class
actions can protect the rights of large numbers of citizens from abusive
police conduct.27 3 In contrast to parens patriae lawsuits, however,
federal class actions are governed by procedural rules designed to
protect the interests of class members and ensure the adequacy of
representation. 2 74 Those interests do not disappear just because the
state attorney general is bringing the case. 2 75 But when state attorneys
general are permitted to claim parens patriae standing under § 1983,

271. See Seth Davis, Implied Public Rights of Action, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 40 (2014) ("Just
as courts limit implied rights of action when private parties sue in a third party capacity, they
should limit substitute rights of action for public litigants in the absence of statutory
authorization.").
272. See Second Amended Class Action Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief and
Individual Damages, Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (No. 1:08cv-01034-SAS) (challenging NYPD's stop-and-frisk practices and seeking individual damages and
injunctive relief).
273. Following a bench trial, the district court found that the NYPD's stop-and-frisk practices
violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. Floyd, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 667. In a separate
opinion, the court issued an injunction requiring, among other things, new forms of officer
training, new reporting and auditing requirements, a pilot program of officer body cameras, and
oversight by an appointed monitor. See generally Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 668
(S.D.N.Y. 2013). After the election of Mayor Bill de Blasio, the city dropped its appeal and the
case settled with the parties agreeing to most of the reforms the district court had ordered.
Benjamin Weiser & Joseph Goldstein, Mayor Says New York City Will Settle Suits on Stop-andFrisk Tactics, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 30, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/31/nyregion/de-blasiostop-and-frisk.html [https://perma.cc/EY8L-FHFR].
274. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a) (setting out requirements for class certification, including
a finding that "the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the
class"); FED. R. CIv. P. 23(b)(3) (requiring that "questions of law or fact common to class
members predominate over any questions affecting only individual members" of a proposed class
and that a class action be "superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently
adjudicating the controversy"); FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2) (requiring notice to class members); FED.
R. Civ. P. 23(e) (requiring court approval of a proposed settlement); FED. R. CIV. P. 23(g)(4)
(requiring class counsel to "fairly and adequately represent the interests of the class").
275. See Margaret H. Lemos, Aggregate Litigation Goes Public:RepresentativeSuits by State
Attorneys General, 126 HARV. L. REV. 486, 530 (2012) (concluding, after describing conflicts of
interest, weak opportunities for client monitoring, distortions in the conduct of litigation that
result from resource constraints, and risks of inadequate settlement in the parenspatriae context,
that "even when it can be lauded on public policy grounds, parens patriae litigation may fail to
serve the interests of the citizens most affected").
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they bypass the procedural safeguards that federal law imposes in the
class-action context.
Accordingly, whether Judge Gibbons or Judge Garth had the
better argument as to whether the conduct by Millvale police officers
was sufficiently pervasive and serious to give rise to a state interest to
litigate as parens patriae is not the point. The whole enterprise of
adjudicating state standing on this basis involves a departure from the
scope and contours of § 1983. State attorneys general can play a useful
role in addressing constitutional violations by police departments
within their jurisdictions, including by litigating in federal court. Before
that happens, however, more is needed than a creative reading of a
statute designed for different purposes. The next Part sets out how best
to empower state attorneys general as agents of police reform.
III. EMPOWERING STATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL

Existing laws are largely inadequate to control misconduct in local
police departments. Given this reality, it is hardly surprising that state
attorneys general have adopted creative doctrinal arguments to
support their claims of standing against local police departments in
federal court. Although state attorneys general can serve as important
agents of police reform, the common law parenspatriae doctrine is not
a reliable avenue forward. Instead, Congress and state legislatures
should enact legislation specifically conferring standing upon state
attorneys general to sue to obtain equitable relief in federal court
against police departments in their jurisdiction to remedy and prevent
violations of constitutional rights.27 6
This approach would keep courts from having to speculate about
which kinds of police abuse affect a "sufficiently substantial segment
of the population"27 7 so as to implicate an attorney's general "quasisovereign interests."2 78 It would also eliminate the difficulty of
determining whether, as a result of Lyons and the sheer practicalities
of litigation, private individuals "could not obtain complete relief
through a private suit."279 More generally, instead of ad hoc

276. Such legislation might be styled as conferring parenspatriae standing. The terminology
is not important. What matters is that authority would stem from a statute-which would,
accordingly specify its scope-rather than be based in a common law doctrine.
277. Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 607 (1982).
278. City of Chicago Complaint, supra note 32, at 5.
279. New York v. 11 Cornwell Co., 695 F.2d 34, 40 (2d Cir. 1982), vacated in part, 718 F.2d 22
(2d Cir. 1983) (en banc).
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determinations by courts, this approach would allow legislatures to
consider and determine the appropriate scope of-and limits tolawsuits by state attorneys general as part of an overall approach to
regulating police departments and protecting constitutional rights. In
the end, this approach is likely to generate better and smarter reform.
Rather than relying on an ambiguous doctrine to ground litigation
efforts, state attorneys general would have a clear blueprint-and
potentially a mandate-to pursue corrective measures. Empowering
state attorneys general in the manner this Article proposes holds the
promise of a new and successful remedy for police misconduct.
A.

CongressionalAuthorization

Given the uncertainties of the common law parenspatriaestanding
doctrine, it makes considerable sense to insist that Congress, as a
statutory matter, confer standing upon state attorneys general before
courts permit them to act as plaintiffs to enforce federal laws protecting
the interests of their citizens. The case for congressional authorization
is particularly strong with respect to states suing cities under § 1983, or
comparable statutes, alleging police violations of constitutional rights
and pursuing broad injunctive relief to overhaul local police
departments.
1. Clarity and Constraint. First, congressional authorization would
provide much needed clarity and constraint on efforts by state
attorneys general to reform local police departments. The current
approach to deciding by inference whether parens patriae standing is
available is a clumsy enterprise. As noted, the Supreme Court insists
that to assert parens patriae standing, states must be pursuing
something more than the interests of individual state citizens, and
lower courts dutifully repeat this requirement. In practice, though,
courts have been willing to recognize an interest on the part of the state
not to have their citizens subject to violations of federal law. If that
suffices for finding a distinct state interest then there is very little
meaning to the requirement; in virtually every case where there are
citizens who have been injured, the state will be able to argue that it
would prefer that those injuries-or others like them-did not arise.
Yet with so much case law now built up around the notion of a quasisovereign interest, courts cannot be counted upon to abandon it in
favor of a more precise yardstick for determining whether a state has
standing. So too, courts are not likely to dispense with the oft-recited
rule that parenspatriaestanding is not available to a state if individuals
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who have been injured could themselves obtain complete relief. That
rule, too, is an unlikely source of constraint. Litigation is inevitably
expensive and otherwise burdensome. There are few cases in which
one would confidently conclude that the costs do not deter somebody
from seeking a remedy, and thus it is almost always possible to posit
that a lawsuit by a state attorney general would add value. And if for
some unlikely reason that conclusion is not persuasive, there are always
other potential victims-who, of course, cannot act because nothing
has happened to them yet -whose interests the state can anticipatorily
protect. In its modern form, parens patriaestanding tends to look like
the state stepping up to litigate on behalf of injured individuals.
Rather than depend upon courts to determine and apply the
requirements of parens patriae standing, it would be far better for
legislatures to set out when state governmental standing is available
and how the requirements for it can be met. Statutory specification of
standing would avoid the need for courts to speculate about "quasisovereign interests" and other concepts that have proven elusive. It
would also allow for tailoring-for recognition of the power of states
to sue under some statutes but perhaps not others, to sue under specific
statutes only in given circumstances, or to seek certain kinds of relief
(like an injunction) but not others (like damages). On this approach,
when state attorneys general sue under a federal statute in order to
protect the rights of their citizens, the court would ask whether the
statute itself confers standing upon the state either in its sovereign
capacity or to litigate on behalf of its citizens. A plain reading of § 1983
is that it does not,2s and thus, absent congressional authorization, state
attorneys general lack standing under § 1983.
In the context of lawsuits against police departments, there are
some additional considerations that also countenance against courts
inferring parenspatriaestanding on their own. Here, the concern is not
that the state attorney general is really just invoking parenspatriaeto
act as the lawyer for injured individuals. Instead, it is that the interests
of specific individuals who have suffered abuses by the police are of
little significance to the litigation because the lawsuit is just a vehicle
for the state attorney general to overhaul a bad local police
department. In other words, parenspatriaestanding turns § 1983 into a
tool for structural reform of police departments led by the state
attorney general.

280.

See supra note 176.
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There might well be sound reasons for reforming a particular
police department, but a lawsuit under § 1983 by a state attorney
general asking a federal court to infer parenspatriaestanding is a poor
means to do it. As explained above, § 1983 is designed to provide
remedies to individuals who suffer violations of their own rights. It is
not and has not served well as a broad mechanism to overhaul the
structure and operations of police departments.2 81 Allowing state
attorneys general to invoke § 1983 as the basis for transforming police
departments within their own jurisdictions represents a novel and
unwise use of the statute.2 82 Because § 1983 is not designed as a tool for
state attorneys general to restructure local police departments,
allowing it to be used as such means proceeding without legislative
specification of the triggers for intervention, the requirements of proof,
available defenses, the changes that can be obtained, the nature of
future oversight, the means to demonstrate compliance, or other
relevant considerations.
When an individual sues under § 1983, the court's task is to assess
whether he or she has proven injury and, if so, to impose a remedy
tailored to the injury the individual has suffered. When state attorneys
general assert parens patriae standing to sue the state's own police
departments under § 1983 and ask, by way of remedies, for broad
reforms, courts operate with far less precision. Indeed, in cases where
a state is suing its own city, there might not even be a real defendant to
push back vigorously on the state's allegations, to question the scope
of remedies that are sought, or to appeal the outcome of the case.
Instead, the city-a subordinate component of state governmentmight simply go along with the state's assertions and demands. By most
accounts, Chicago, which entered into a consent decree with the Illinois
attorney general, offered very little resistance to the lawsuit.2 3 A city
might also offer little resistance to a lawsuit brought by the federal
government, but in such instances the state itself offers a potentially
separate source of resistance.
Federal structural-reform litigation, though successful in
addressing a wide range of constitutional violations, has long presented
281. See Jason Mazzone & Stephen Rushin, From Selma to Ferguson: The Voting Rights Act
as a Blueprintfor Police Reform, 105 CALIF. L. REv. 263, 277 (2017).
282. See Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 379 (1976) (explaining, in a § 1983 case against the
Philadelphia Police Department, that "principles of equity ... militate heavily against the grant
of an injunction except in the most extraordinary circumstances").
283. Ruthhart et al., supra note 33 (detailing the Chicago mayor's hesitant but eventual
acceptance of the consent decree).
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concerns about the size and scope of judicial intervention, the resulting
impact upon the powers and operations of state and local governments,
and accountability for reform measures.2 In recent cases, the Supreme
Court has disapproved broad injunctive relief in structural-reform
cases. 285 These concerns are magnified when, rather than litigation
brought by individual victims or the DOJ, state attorneys general and
city mayors collaborate in federal court to reform police departments.
In addition, parens patriae lawsuits typically preclude private actions
raising the same claims.286 In this regard, parens patriae lawsuits by a
state against its own city present a unique risk that the lawsuit will serve
to shield the city from other forms of litigation and, perhaps, violate
the due process interests of individual litigants.2
The consent decree in Attorney General Madigan's excessiveforce lawsuit against Chicago requires the CPD to implement reforms
that cover virtually every aspect of policing. Among the obligations are
the integration of "a community policing philosophy into CPD
operations" with "systematic use of community partnerships and
problem-solving
techniques"
and
with
"[a]ll
CPD
members .

.

. responsible

for

furthering

this

philosophy";'

a

specification that "CPD will provide police services to all members of
the public without bias and will treat all persons with the courtesy and
dignity which is inherently due every person as a human being";` a
requirement that "CPD members address individuals, using the names,
pronouns, and titles of respect appropriate to the individual's gender

.

284. See, e.g., Donald L. Horowitz, Decreeing OrganizationalChange:Judicial Supervision of
Public Institutions, 1983 DUKE L.J. 1265, 1294-95 ("Nominal defendants [in structural reform
cases] are sometimes happy to be sued and happier still to lose."); Michael W. McConnell, Why
Hold Elections? Using Consent Decrees To Insulate Policiesfrom PoliticalChange, 1987 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 295, 317 (1987) (arguing that government officials may rely upon consent decrees to
"block ordinary avenues of political change").
285. See, e.g., Horne v. Flores, 557 U.S. 433, 448 (2009) ("[I]nstitutional reform injunctions
often raise sensitive federalism concerns."); Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 362 (1996) (overturning,
as "inordinately-indeed, wildly-intrusive" a district court's system-wide injunction in a class
action lawsuit brought by prisoners involving claims of denial of access to courts and counsel
because of limitations on available legal resources in the prison setting).
286. See Lemos, supra note 275, at 500 ("Although the case law on the preclusive effect of
public aggregate litigation is surprisingly sparse, the prevailing view is that the judgment in a state
case is binding on every person whom the state represents as parens patriae." (quotations
omitted)).
287. See id. at 531 ("The current state of affairs is not just incoherent; it is also unconstitutional
to the extent that parenspatriaesuits preclude private litigation . .
288. City of Chicago Consent Decree, supra note 34, at 3.
289. Id at 15.
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identity as expressed or clarified by the individual"; 29 0 a duty to
"incorporate the concept of impartial policing into its annual in-service
training for all officers"; 29 1 a requirement that the CPD annually
conduct "an assessment of the relative frequency of all misdemeanor
arrests and administrative notices of violation . . . of persons in specific

demographic categories, including race and gender"; 29 2 detailed
requirements about use of force; 293 measures to recruit, hire and
promote "qualified candidates at all ranks that reflect a broad cross
section of the Chicago community the Department serves" ;294 the
provision to CPD officers of "a range of support services that comport
with mental health professional standards and that seek to minimize
the risk of harm from stress, trauma, alcohol and substance abuse, and
mental illness," including "readily accessible confidential counseling
services with both internal and external referrals; peer support;
traumatic incident debriefings and crisis counseling; and stress
management and officer wellness training";295 new mechanisms for
receiving and responding to citizen complaints and publishing data on
those complaints; 296 and the appointment of a monitor to ensure
compliance with all of the obligations. 21 There is no likelihood that
private litigants, even in a well-planned class action, could obtain these
same extensive remedial measures. 2 98 As appealing as these reforms
might seem, they do not reflect a proper use of § 1983.
2. Avoiding Conflicts. Second, statutory authorization would
prevent parens patriae from becoming a vehicle for unconstrained
structural-reform litigation that may conflict with other existing policereform efforts. Congress has already provided a statutory mechanism
for structural reform of police departments through litigation in federal
court. 34 U.S.C. § 12601 empowers the DOJ-but not state attorneys
290. Id. at 18.
291. Id. at 22.
292. Id. at 24.
293. Id. at 46-72.
294. Id. at 72.
295. Id. at 106.
296. Id. at 118-70.
297. Id. at 186.
298. See Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362,379 (1976) (invalidating an injunction in a § 1983 police
misconduct case that "significantly revis[ed] the internal procedures of the Philadelphia police
department" as "a sharp limitation on the department's'latitude in the dispatch of its own internal
affairs"' (quotations omitted) (quoting Cafeteria & Rest. Workers Union, Local 473, AFL-CIO
v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 896 (1961))).
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general-to seek broad equitable relief against police departments
engaged in a pattern or practice of police misconduct. The DOJ has
made use of this power to reform some of the nation's most troubled
police departments. 29 9 There is a good argument that § 12601 is not a
powerful enough medicine and that the DOJ has not made use of it as
aggressively as the disease requires.3 m But those assessments do not
provide a basis for now inferring that state attorneys general can
engage in their own structural reform litigation under § 1983.
Widening the lens, issues of federal versus state power loom large.
In Porter, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that the
Supremacy Clause provided a basis for inferring state standing: state
government officials are required to abide by federal constitutional
protections for constitutional rights and have an interest in responding
to violations of those rights within their states. 30 1 The federal
Constitution certainly binds the.states, but that does not easily lead to
the conclusion that the state attorney general may sue a city in federal
court under federal law. What Judge Gibbons ignored in Porteris that
the federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, and Congress
specifies which cases the lower federal courts may hear. More
fundamentally, under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment,
Congress has "power to enforce, by appropriate legislation" the
amendment's provisions.30 2 Section 1983 was enacted pursuant to that
authority.3 03 If Congress does not provide for enforcement by means of
states suing cities in federal court, courts should be reluctant to permit
this mechanism. Indeed, there is considerable irony to the Third
Circuit's approach. In Porter, the Third Circuit was willing to allow
Pennsylvania to act as parenspatriae in a lawsuit against a city under
§ 1983. But just seven months before the en banc decision in Porterand
after the case was first argued, a panel of the same circuit court refused,
in United States v. City of Philadelphia,to infer standing on the part of

299. See Rushin, Structural Reform Litigation,supra note 46, at 1347 ("[M]any of the nation's
largest police departments including Los Angeles, Detroit, Seattle, Albuquerque, Newark,
Pittsburgh, Cincinnati, Washington, D.C., and New Orleans have undergone or are currently
undergoing this sort of SRL.").
300. See, e.g., Rushin, Federal Enforcement of Police Reform, supra note 47, at 3228-30
(describing patterns of enforcement of § 12601).
301. Pennsylvania v. Porter, 659 F.2d 306, 315 (1981).
302. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
303. Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 665 (1978).
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the DOJ to sue to remedy police misconduct in Philadelphia. 3 0 In our
judgment, a consistent approach would be to treat the DOJ and the
state attorney general the same way. But if one and not the other is to
have standing-and the decision is based on inferences about who
should be empowered to enforce federal law-the DOJ would seem a
more natural choice. In fact, that is the choice that Congress made
when it enacted § 12601. In this sense, it is wise to recall that Article
III's standing requirements reinforce the Constitution's structural
divisions of power. Standing promotes federalism by limiting the cases
that can be heard in federal court-a particular concern when an entity
of state government is a party. Standing also guards against judicial
encroachment upon the powers of Congress and the federal executive
branch. Courts that infer standing from statutory silence can bypass
congressional control of the reach of federal claims. Likewise, a relaxed
approach to standing can negate Congress's choice to limit
enforcement power to the federal executive branch.
Congress might support empowering state attorneys general suing
police departments under federal law in federal court and obtaining
remedies that prevent future violations of constitutional rights. But
Congress should authorize state attorneys general to do so as a
statutory matter. There are different ways in which Congress could
achieve this outcome. Congress could amend § 1983 so as specifically
to empower state attorneys general to litigate under that law in
designated circumstances. Alternatively, Congress could enact a new
statute granting state attorneys authority to bring cases against local
police departments-or even state governmental actors more
generally-for violations of federal rights. Through either approach,
Congress would be able to determine how litigation by state attorneys
general can be made compatible with the grant of authority to the DOJ
to engage in structural-reform efforts. For instance, Congress might
well determine that the DOJ should have the first opportunity to
initiate litigation and that the state is empowered to step in only when
the DOJ declines to bring a case. Congress might determine that the
DOJ is in a better position to secure robust protections for individual
rights and so give the DOJ stronger tools than are available to state
attorneys general. Alternatively, Congress might instead decide that
state attorneys general have a better understanding of local conditions

304. United States v. City of Philadelphia, 644 F.2d 187, 190 (3d Cir. 1980). City of
Philadelphia was decided on Dec. 29, 1980; Porterwas first argued on October 6, 1980, and
decided en banc on July 30, 1981.
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and the need for tailored reforms and so choose to allow them to play
a larger role in litigation efforts. Some commentators have emphasized
the role that state attorneys general can play in resisting muscular
federal executive action, particularly during times of congressional
gridlock.305 Pursuant to a properly crafted statutory framework, state
attorneys general might also play a role in enforcing federal law when
the federal executive decides to step back.
Insisting on congressional authorization is not out of the ordinary.
Congress has proven perfectly capable of assigning state governments
standing to enforce federal law. Congress has done this under various
federal statutes.3 0 Some federal statutes authorize the state to litigate
as parens patriae and specify the precise circumstances under which
such standing is to be exercised, the available remedies, and the effects
upon the claims of individuals who might prefer to litigate on their
own.307 Notably, when Congress has allowed parenspatriaestanding by
statute, it has not been constrained by judicial rules of "quasisovereign" interests and the like; in some instances, Congress has
authorized states to litigate on behalf of injured citizens.30 8

305. See Margaret H. Lemos & Ernest A. Young, State Public-Law Litigation in an Age of
Polarization, 97 TEX. L. REV. 43, 64 (2018) (describing how, through litigation, "states can
challenge federal [executive] action that arguably goes too far").
306. See infra note 307.
307. For example:
If the Attorney General of a State has reasonable cause to believe that any person or
group of persons is being, has been, or may be injured by conduct constituting a
violation of this section, such Attorney General may commence a civil action in the
name of such State, as parens patriae on behalf of natural persons residing in
such State, in any appropriate United States District Court.
Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances, 18 U.S.C. § 248(c)(3)(A)-(B) (2018) (allowing in such
cases for "temporary, preliminary or permanent injunctive relief, compensatory damages, and
civil penalties"). The Commodity Exchange Act includes a similar provision:
Whenever it shall appear to the attorney general of any State, the administrator of the
securities laws of any State, or such other official as a State may designate, that the
interests of the residents of that State have been, are being, or may be threatened or
adversely affected because any person (other than a contract market, derivatives
transaction execution facility, clearinghouse, floor broker, or floor trader) has engaged
in, is engaging or is about to engage in, any act or practice constituting a violation of
any provision of this chapter or any rule, regulation, or order of the [U.S. Commodity
Futures Trading] Commission thereunder, the State may bring a suit in equity or an
action at law on behalf of its residents to enjoin such act or practice, to enforce
compliance with this chapter, or any rule, regulation, or order of the Commission
thereunder, to obtain damages on behalf of their residents, or to obtain such further
and other relief as the court may deem appropriate.
Futures Trading Act of 1978 § 15, 7 U.S.C. § 13a-2(1) (2018).
308. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Mid-Atl. Toyota Distribs., 704 F.2d 125, 129 n.8 (4th Cir. 1983)
(explaining that under the Clayton Act "the statutory right of action is more expansive" than
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Co.
of
Standard Oil
in Hawaii v.
example,
For
3
antitrust
alleging
companies
four
oil
sued
"
Hawaii
California,
violations.31 0 Hawaii sued in three capacities: in its proprietary capacity
for alleged overcharges on petroleum sold to the state; in its capacity
as parens patriaefor a general injury to the state's economy; and as a
representative of the class of all petroleum buyers in the state.31 1 it
sought injunctive relief and monetary damages on each basis.3 12 After
the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit dismissed the claims based
on parens patriae, Hawaii sought review in the Supreme Court.313 The
Court held that parens patriae standing was unavailable under the
applicable statutory provision, § 4 of the Clayton Act.314 The Supreme
Court had previously ruled that under § 16 of the Clayton Act, the state
of Georgia could obtain an injunction against northern railroads that
had conspired to restrict trade to the South.315 In Standard Oil,
however, the Court held that the rule in the Georgia case did not apply
because-unlike § 4-§ 16, involving injunctive relief, contained no
requirement that the asserted injury be in "business or property." 3 16
Given this distinction, the Standard Oil Court refused to infer parens
patriaestanding under § 4, in part because doing so risked duplicative
damages-the state could recover for harm to its economy at the same
time individuals recovered for personal injuries.317 In the absence of
clear statutory language, the Court would not permit the state's claim
to proceed.3 18 After a separate ruling by the Court of Appeals for the

would be available under the common law of parens patriae, which does not permit states to sue
"on behalf of injured natural residents").
309. Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 405 U.S. 251 (1982).
310. Id. at 253.
311. Id. at 252-53.
312. Id.
313. Id. at 254.
314. Id. at 255.
315. Georgia v. Penn. R.R., 324 U.S. 439, 460 (1945).
316. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 405 U.S. at 261.
317. Id. at 264.
318. Id. ("[I]f the ... injury is to be compensable under the antitrust laws, we should insist
upon a clear expression of a congressional purpose to make it so, and no such expression is to be
found in § 4 of the Clayton Act."). Significantly, it was the nature of the claim that drove the
conclusion:
The question in this case is not whether Hawaii may maintain its lawsuit on behalf of
its citizens, but rather whether the injury for which it seeks to recover is compensable
under § 4 of the Clayton Act. Hence, Hawaii's claim cannot be resolved simply by
reference to any general principles governing parens patriaeactions.
Id. at 259.
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Ninth Circuit also rejecting parens patriae standing,3 19 Congress
authorized state attorney generals to act as parens patriae to seek
monetary damages. In 1976, as part of the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust
Improvements Act,320 Congress amended the Clayton Antitrust Act to
allow such suits:
Any attorney general of a State may bring a civil action in the name
of such State, as parens patriae on behalf of natural persons residing
in such State, in any district court of the United States having
jurisdiction of the defendant, to secure monetary relief . . . for injury
sustained by such natural persons to their property by reason of any
violation of [the Sherman Act].321
This congressional response demonstrates the benefits of
statutory authorization for state governmental standing. In creating
standing for state attorneys general under § 4, Congress took account
of the overall statutory scheme and structured standing rules with an
eye to other potential claims against a defendant and also the relevant
state interests. The amended statute requires the state attorney
general, when acting as parens patriae in the manner the statute
permits, to publish notice of the lawsuit.322 It also gives individuals on
whose behalf the suit has been filed an opportunity to have their own
claims excluded3 23 from the state's action in order to prevent the state's
final judgment from having res judicata effect as to their claims.3 24 The
statute also requires that courts exclude from monetary rewards
amounts duplicative of prior awards for the same injury and amounts
allocable to excluded claims or to business entities.325 In addition, the
statute sets out how recovered damages are to be dispensed.3 26 Further,
it requires that the U.S. attorney general notify state attorneys general
of actions brought by the United States involving violations of the

319. See generally California v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 474 F.2d 774 (9th Cir.) (taking the view that
parenspatriae recovery would be inconsistent with class action laws), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 908
(1973).
320. See Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, Pub. L. 94-435, tit. III, 90
Stat. 1383, 1394-97 (codified at scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
321. 15 U.S.C. § 15c(a)(1) (2018).
322. Id. § 15c(b)(1).
323. Id. § 15c(b)(2).
324. Id. § 15c(b)(3).
325. Id. § 15c(a)(1).
326. Id. § 15e.
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antitrust laws for which the states themselves could sue.3 27 Finally, and
significantly, these various provisions are deemed to apply in every
state except where state law specifies otherwise.
That Congress has at times created parens patriaestanding under
some statutes cautions against inferring such standing in other statutes
that do not provide for it. If in some circumstances, Congress has taken
the trouble to confer parenspatriaestanding and to specify its scope as
part of provided-for enforcement mechanisms, in other circumstances
such standing may not well serve statutory goals. After all, a statute's
successful operation does not depend upon courts maximizing
opportunities for lawsuits under it. Underenforcement of a statute can
be problematic but so can overenforcement; Congress frequently limits
the possibilities for lawsuits as a mechanism for enforcing a statute.
Moreover, nothing prevents states -or even their attorneys general
from lobbying Congress to confer standing upon state attorneys
general to sue under a federal statute.329
3. PromotingAggressive Oversight. Third, statutory authorization
may ultimately result in more aggressive oversight of local police
departments, rather than less. Even though some courts have
acquiesced to efforts by state attorneys general to pursue equitable
relief against police departments under the parens patriae doctrine,
there remains limited appellate precedent on the issue. As such, it
makes sense that, so far, few state attorneys general have pursued cases
against police departments on the basis of parens patriae. By
specifically conferring standing on state attorneys general, Congress
can eliminate uncertainties that may hinder litigation.
Empowered by Congress to make use of the federal courts, state
attorneys general can play an important role in police reform. In the
past, civil litigation has proven an unreliable means to curb police
violations of constitutional rights. Among other impediments, rules of

327. Id. § 15f(a). Subsection (b) requires the U.S. attorney general to turn over investigative
files if requested by the state attorney general. Id. § 15f(b).
328. Id. § 15h ("Sections 15c, 15d, 15e, 15f, and 15g of this title shall apply in any State, unless
such State provides by law for its nonapplicability in such State.").
329. See Amy Widman & Prentiss Cox, State Attorneys General's Use of Concurrent Public
Enforcement Authority in FederalConsumer ProtectionLaws, 33 CARDOZO L. REv. 53,54 (2011)
("Due to the power that inherently comes with enforcement authority, interested parties lobby
for or against such legislative grants routinely.").
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qualified immunity,330 limitations on punitive damages,33 1 and
indemnification policies 332 have blunted the effectiveness of civil
lawsuits. Criminal prosecutions of police officers have also failed to
generate reform, in large part because of the sheer difficulty of
prosecutors securing indictments and convictions against officers.33 3
And even when the U.S. attorney general has supported a strong
federal role, the DOJ has lacked the resources to pursue more than a
handful of § 12601 cases each year. 334 Given the low risk of ever being
held accountable, police departments and their governing
municipalities have proven unwilling to invest in reform measures,
particularly if doing so will anger police unions and other powerful
interests 35 and siphon resources from schools, parks, and community
infrastructure.33 6 Empowering state attorneys general to act as agents
of police reform could change the entire landscape. State attorneys
general may be less indebted to police unions than other governmental
actors. 337 They are well positioned to recognize and investigate
violations of constitutional rights. They have considerably more

330.
against
331.
awards
332.
333.

See supranote 81 and accompanying text (describing qualified immunity barriers to suits
state officials under § 1983).
See supra note 80 and accompanying text (describing the case law on punitive damage
in § 1983 suits).
See supra note 82 and accompanying text (discussing indemnification policies).
See PHILIP M. STINSON, THE HENRY A. WALLACE POLICE CRIME DATABASE,

https://policecrime.bgsu.cdu [https://perma.cc/NHK9-8PVP] (using media reports to estimate the
number of police officers arrested and charged for various types of criminal offenses from 2005
to 2013 and finding that only fifty-four police officers faced criminal charges, despite the fact that
roughly ten-to-eleven thousand individuals were killed by law enforcement officers during this
same time period).
334. Rushin, Structural Reform Litigation,supra note 46, at 1408.
335. Commentators have noted the inherent conflict of interest here:
Elected district attorneys, who are subject to intense pressure from police unions, and
their line attorneys who must rely on law enforcement for the success of every case they
try, have a clear conflict of interest when the tables are turned and they must decide
whether to bring charges and lead cases against police-defendants.
Kate Levine, Who Shouldn't Prosecute the Police, 101 IOWA L. REV. 1447, 1483 (2016).
336. Rushin, Structural Reform Litigation, supra note 46, at 1408-09 (discussing municipal
resources and the high costs of police reform).
337. To be clear, this is a hypothesis-based in part on anecdotal evidence that police unions
give substantial contributions to state legislators and local officials. More research is necessary to
determine whether state attorneys general receive similar political contributions or are subject to
lobbying from police unions. See Stephen Rushin, Unions and Police Reform, in CAMBRIDGE
HANDBOOK OF POLICING IN THE UNITED STATES 535-37 (Tamara Rice Lave & Eric J. Miller

eds., 2019) (discussing how police unions have exerted their political power to alter legislation in
state legislative bodies).
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resources than do private litigants. 338 They bring technical expertise to
police accountability efforts. And, located in every state in the union
where they typically oversee a large cadre of attorneys and staffers,
they have more manpower than the DOJ. 33 9
B.

State Law Authorization

There are also compelling reasons for insisting that state attorneys
general be authorized by state statutory law before they proceed in
federal court under federal law on claims of police misconduct.
Accordingly, states would lack standing unless conferred both by
federal and state statutes. To enforce this requirement, Congress itself
can specify that the standing it gives to a state attorney general only
exists when it is also authorized under state law.
The requirement for state statutory authority gives notice to police
departments that, as a matter of state law, their own state attorney
general has a powerful tool to respond to police misconduct and that
redress is not dependent upon DOJ intervention or lawsuits by victims.
This notice may result in proactive reform by local police departments.
Authority in state law also normalizes and regularizes a state attorney
general's lawsuit, thus tempering perceptions that the attorney
general-who may be of a different political party than the legislative
majority or even the governor-is engaged in creative litigation out of
political ambition3 0 or in service of partisan interests.3 41 So too, when
the state legislature has authorized the lawsuit, the attorney general is
implementing state law-not somehow acting as the agent of the
federal government. A state legislature can also tailor authorization in
ways that reflect circumstances and interests of the particular state. For
338. See Lemos & Young, supra note 305, at 65 ("In recent decades, state AGs have emerged
as a uniquely powerful cadre of lawyers."); id. at 120-21 (identifying subpoena powers and other
advantages state attorney generals have compared to private parties).
339. Although the DOJ also has a large number of attorneys in U.S. Attorneys' offices all
across the country, the DOJ has typically handled investigations of police departments pursuant
to § 12601 through its Civil Rights Division in Washington, D.C. See Rushin, FederalEnforcement
ofPolice Reform, supra note 47, at 3230 (describing how cases under § 12601 are handled through
the Special Litigation Section of the Civil Rights Division and the resulting resource constraints).
Assuming that practice holds, state attorneys general in the aggregate have more resources to
address policing than does DOJ.
340. See Davis, supra note 271, at 46 ("Aggressively pursuing litigation as a means of policymaking is one way for a state attorney general to build political capital.").
341. See Lemos & Young, supra note 305, at 114 ("[A]lthough one might hope that AGs
consider the interests of all citizens, AGs' incentives to do so are, at the very least,
questionable.... [T]o the extent that state public-law litigation has a partisan slant, state citizens
not from the AG's party may strongly prefer that the litigation not be brought.").
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instance, a state legislature might require the state attorney general to
issue it a report and recommendations prior to filing any lawsuit so that
the legislative branch has an opportunity to take corrective action on
its own.
There are different forms authorizing state statutes could take.
For example, Congress itself might insist upon very specific language
that invokes the particular federal law at issue. At a minimum, though,
it is desirable for the state statute to provide that the attorney general
is empowered to bring in any court of competent jurisdiction claims
against police departments, governing municipal bodies, and
government officials in cases of police misconduct that violates
federally protected rights.342 In many states there are generally worded
statutes authorizing the state attorney general to bring lawsuits to
protect the interests of the state and its residents.3 43 Although courts
have been willing to accept such statutes as permitting parens patriae
lawsuits in a variety of contexts,2" they should not be deemed adequate
authority for state attorneys general to sue under federal law in federal
court to remedy police misconduct. Instead, given the potential impact
upon the organization and operations of a police department, the state
legislature should provide more specific authorization to the attorney
general to litigate." Similarly, although some courts have permitted
state attorneys general to invoke the common law doctrine of parens
patriae as a basis for standing to sue police departments,3 standing

342. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 52.3 (West 2018) (permitting the California attorney.general
to obtain equitable and declaratory relief in California state court to eliminate patterns of
unconstitutional misconduct).
343. Wisconsin provides an example of such a statute:
The governor, whenever in the governor's opinion the rights, interests or property of
the state have been or are liable to be injuriously affected, may require the attorney
general to institute and prosecute any proper action or proceeding for the redress or
prevention thereof ....
Wis. STAT. § 14.11 (2019); see also N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 63(1) (McKinney 2019) (directing the
attorney general to "[p]rosecute ... all actions and proceedings in which the state is interested").
344. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Mid-Atl. Toyota Distribs., Inc., 704 F.2d 125, 130 (4th Cir. 1983)
(holding that the state attorneys general of three states and the corporation counsel of the District
of Columbia had power to bring parens patriaesuits under the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act, given the
general statutory authorization to "represent the jurisdiction and its interests in litigation").
345. Some states, for instance, have statutes giving the state attorney general specific
authority to litigate under federal antitrust law. See, e.g., TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 15.40
(West 2019) ("The attorney general may bring an action on behalf of the state ... to recover the
damages provided for by the federal antitrust laws. . . ."); see also Texas v. Scott & Fetzer Co.,
709 F.2d 1024, 1025-28 (5th Cir. 1983) (construing this statutory language to encompass parens
patriaeactions).
346. See supra notes 235-39 and accompanying text.
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should be authorized by state statute. Thus, under this approach, in
Attorney General Madigan's lawsuit against Chicago, invocation of
common law standing as parens patriaeM7 would not suffice; a state
statute authorizing the attorney general would be required to bring the
lawsuit.3" The Illinois legislature should itself determine whether and
when the state attorney general is permitted to sue in federal court
under federal law in order to redress police misconduct in Chicago or
elsewhere in Illinois.
State legislatures are perfectly capable of conferring specific
authority upon their attorneys general. Various states already provide
attorneys general with statutory parens patriae standing to enforce
certain laws and, in so doing, specify such things as the circumstances
in which the state attorney general can sue, where the lawsuit may be
brought, the impact upon private claims, the kinds of relief available,
conditions for settlement of a case, and the distribution of recovered
damages.349 Some such laws specify that statutory authority is in
addition to that provided for under the common law.350 States also have
experience in conferring specific statutory authority upon their
attorneys general to sue under designated federal laws."5s
Requiring state statutory authorization will generate some
lumpiness in the enforcement of federal law. Some states will permit
their attorneys general to sue to remedy police misconduct. Others will
not. Some will provide authority only in certain circumstances. Some
state legislatures might decide that if the state attorney general is to sue
local police departments, the claims should be based on state
constitutional protections and the cases should be brought in state

347. See City of Chicago Complaint, supra note 32, at 1, 4.
348. Similarly, we find lacking the claim by the New York City Bar Association's Committee
on Civil Rights that § 63 of the New York Executive Law, which provides that "[tjhe attorneygeneral shall ... [p]rosecute ... all actions and proceedings in which the state is interested,"
constitutes statutory authorization for parens patriae lawsuits to remedy police misconduct.
N.Y.C. BAR Assoc. COMM. ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE AUTHORITY OF THE NEW YORK ATTORNEY
GENERAL

WHEN

POLICE

ABUSE

THEIR

AUTHORITY

1-2

(2002),

https://www.nycbar.org/pdf/report/Report%20on%20the`%2OAuth%20of%20the%20AG.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6VL5-GFNC].
349. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 6-4-111 (2019) (state antitrust law); CONN. GEN. STAT.
§ 35-32 (2019) (state antitrust law); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 46-12.3-5 (2019) (state environmental
protection statute); WASH. REV. CODE § 19.350.030 (2019) (state consumer protection statute).
350. See, e.g., CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 16760 (West 2019) (state antitrust law).
351. See, e.g., TEx. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 15.40(a) (West 2019) ("The attorney general
may bring an action on behalf of the state or any of its political subdivisions or tax supported
institutions to recover the damages provided for by the federal antitrust laws.").
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court.352 Likewise, there will be differences in how, in practice, state
attorneys general make use of statutory authorization. Some might
never sue a police department. Some might do so only in response to
especially egregious police practices or as a response to high-profile
incidents that generate strong public calls for action. Some attorneys
general might quickly settle cases with only modest reforms. Other
attorneys general will stay with the case to pursue sweeping change.
Enforcement of federal law will also likely vary within a single
state over time. One attorney general might be disinclined to go after
police departments or fear voter retaliation for doing so. The next
attorney general who takes office in the state might make police reform
a mandate-or see it as the stepping stone to another office. A
Republican attorney general might target only police departments in
cities with Democratic mayors. The attorney general might litigate
when the legislature and the governor-perhaps of a different political
party-are themselves disinterested in addressing police misconduct.
Broader political circumstances might also play a role. For example,
state attorneys general might be content to leave lawsuits to the DOJ
but become more active if it takes a hands-off approach. The converse
is also imaginable: a state attorney general inspired by federal
intervention to do something at home, even if only as a means to avoid
the DOJ bringing suit. A flurry of lawsuits by state attorneys general
around the nation might prompt the disinclined to join the party. For
all of these reasons, there will likely be lawsuits in some states but not
others and at some times but not at others. There will probably also be
variation in the types of police conduct targeted and the remedies
sought.
Lumpiness in the enforcement of federal law is not necessarily a
problem, and it can be a virtue. For one thing, lumpiness indicates that
federal law operates in sync with mechanisms of state government and
in a way that is attentive to differences among states.353 Autonomy on

352. See generally JEFFREY S. SUTTON, 51 IMPERFECr SOLUTIONS: STATES AND THE
MAKING OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2018) (cxploring ways in which state
constitutions and state courts play a robust role in protecting individual rights).
353. In the antitrust area, states have tailored provisions of the Clayton Act. Illinois is one
such example:
Before the filing of the first pleading in federal district court in any civil action brought
by the Attorney General in the name of the State as parens patriae on behalf of the
natural persons residing in this State, as authorized by Section 4c of the Clayton Act, 15
U.S.C.A. 15c, the Attorney General shall file with the Auditor General a statement
disclosing the fee arrangements applicable to the attorneys' fees in relation to that civil
action.
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the part of state attorneys general confirms they are not puppets of a
federal government that lacks respect for the states. Lumpiness also
generates useful information about how federal law might best be
implemented. Before suing under federal law, a state attorney general
can watch how litigation plays out in another state. Members of the
public can also point to successful reform through litigation in other
states as a reason for their own attorney general to act.
Additionally, and perhaps even more importantly, variation may
be the price for getting many state legislatures on board. Without some
possibility of state-level control over litigation against police
departments, state legislatures might be unwilling to permit the state
attorney general to sue. Likewise, without an ability to control the
litigation, the state attorney general might be reluctant to proceed at
all. Of course, federal law should not be subject to so much state-level
control that it no longer has a national character. Yet so long as
Congress sets certain legislative floors and the DOJ remains an
alternative source of enforcement, some variability from one state to
the next does not necessarily present a difficulty.
Indeed, the approach this Article has set out could represent a
healthy interaction between federal and state government in securing
federal constitutional rights. Congress would specify when state
attorneys general are able to sue in federal court to correct police
violations of constitutional rights. Within these parameters, each state
legislature would decide on the scope of power its own state attorney
general would hold and exercise-with the understanding that the
alternative could be intrusive investigations and lawsuits by the DOJ
or other federal actors. The federal government would promote baselevel uniformity in safeguards against abusive police practices while
state governments would remain free to tailor responses and remedies
to local experiences and conditions. States can help implement and
shape federal requirements but within a framework in which there
remains federal control. Congress would be able to determine at the
outset the appropriate role of states, and the federal executive branch
would be positioned to displace, if needed, state-level efforts.
C.

Challenges

The obvious challenge for the proposal this Article offers is that it
requires legislative action at both the federal and state levels. At the

15 ILL. COMP. STAT. 205/4b (2019).
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federal level, even when there is strong support for laws to protect civil
rights, getting Congress to act has proven difficult.354 Police reform is
an especially complex political issue, and it is likely that most-if not
all-members of Congress are sensitive to the hazards of federal
legislation that affects local police departments. Perhaps, at least for
now, federal police-reform legislation is unlikely. Nonetheless, the
approach this Article offers, involving a partnership between federal
and state government, almost certainly has a higher chance of success
than more heavy-handed alternatives.
At the state level, some important dynamics bear longer
exploration. A basic question is: Why would a state legislature ever
authorize the state attorney general to sue police departments and
governing municipalities within the state under federal law in federal
court? One reason is that such authorization can be an easy mechanism
for the legislature to address problems of police misconduct without
actually having to deal with all of the details of the solution. Rather
than grappling with how state-law reform should look or how to punish
police departments or municipalities where problems are not cured,
the state legislature can simply authorize its attorney general to act
under federal law.
The legislature can kick the problem to the attorney general, who
will bear the blame if the problem persists or pursuing a remedy goes
badly. From the perspective of members of the legislature, the office of
the attorney general might be a particularly good target for delegation
of police reform. In most states, the attorney general is elected and thus
answers directly to the public.355 Assignment of police reform to the
attorney general can thus minimize the risk of voter backlash directed
against the legislature. A legislator's incentive to empower the attorney
general might be especially strong if the attorney general is of a
different party: a hazardous assignment can be a way to keep a rival in
check.
What if state legislatures do not provide their attorneys general
with the requisite statutory authority to litigate in federal court under
federal law in cases of police misconduct-or indeed affirmatively bar
354. For example, Congress has not adopted a new coverage formula for the Voting Rights
Act in response to the Supreme Court's ruling in Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529 (2013),
that the existing formula, based as it was on outdated information, was unconstitutional. Id. at
556.
355. Scott M. Matheson, Jr., ConstitutionalStatus and Role of the State Attorney General, 6 U.
FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 1, 6 (1993) ("The state attorney general is popularly elected in forty-three
states.").
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such actions? The scenario is not unimaginable. Even if there is general
concern with police misconduct and recognition of the need for reform,
members of a state legislature might not approve of the specific remedy
of lawsuits by a state attorney general in federal court. They might
prefer a legislative response and consider states suing cities to be
deeply problematic. They might also take the position that if the
attorney general is to bring a lawsuit, it should be brought in state court
under state law. If both federal and state statutory authorization is
needed, the result may be that some state attorneys general will simply
be unable to make use of a tool that Congress has offered.
There are ways to eliminate state impediments. As a sheer matter
of federal power, Congress could conceivably do away with any need
for state statutory authorization and override any state law that
prohibits a state attorney general from exercising federally conferred
standing. Under the Supremacy Clause, valid federal law trumps
conflicting or inconsistent state law.356 A valid federal law that says the
state attorney general has standing would thus be superior to a state
law that says the state attorney general does not. However, the obvious
cost to such a federal law is the loss of the considerable benefits, as
described above, of dual congressional and state authorization. In
addition, as a constitutional matter, a federal override may implicate
issues of state governmental sovereignty that the Supreme Court has
emphasized in recent years. Concerns with state sovereignty take
different forms. One form, relevant here, is the ban on the federal
government "commandeering" the operations of state government.35 7
A federal law that merely permits the state attorney general to sue does
not involve unconstitutional commandeering of a state officer. By
contrast, if Congress somehow required state attorneys general to sue

356. U.S. CONST. art. VI.
the
357. "While Congress has substantial powers to govern the Nation directly ...
Constitution has never been understood to confer upon Congress the ability to require the States
to govern according to Congress' instructions." New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 162
(1992) (invalidating provisions of the federal Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments
Act requiring states to regulate low-level radioactive waste). A few years after New York v. United
States, the Court reaffirmed the anticommandeering doctrine:
Congress cannot circumvent... [the prohibition established in New York v. United
States] by conscripting the State's officers directly. The Federal Government may
neither issue directives requiring the States to address particular problems, nor
command the States' officers, or those of their political subdivisions, to administer or
enforce a federal regulatory program.
Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997) (invalidating provisions of the Brady Handgun
Violence Prevention Act requiring local law enforcement officials to conduct background checks
for firearms purchases).
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to remedy police reform-say upon notification of reasonable cause or
at the direction of the DOJ-then the absence of choice is likely to
trigger plausible anticommandeering objections.358 Likewise, a state
legislature is not commandeered merely because its own law is
displaced by federal law. However, if federal law displaces a state ban
on lawsuits by the state attorney general, the state legislature might
more plausibly contend that the federal law involves commandeering
on the ground that the state legislature must, as a result, make
resources available for the state attorney general to bring the lawsuits.
Still, anticommandeering objections, while reflective of basic
principles of federalism, will not necessarily prevail even against a
federal law that actually required a state attorney general to sue to
address police misconduct. Congress derives its power to respond to
constitutional violations by the police from its powers to enforce the
Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment, which incorporates most of the provisions of the Bill of
Rights against the states.359 Commandeering of the states has been held
unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause,3" but it is far from clear
whether the same rules apply when Congress legislates under the
Reconstruction Amendments. The Supreme Court itself has not
decided whether the anticommandeering principle applies to
Congress's Reconstruction powers, but it has held that a properly
"congruen[t] and proportional[]" federal statute enacted under Section
5 of the Fourteenth Amendment may force state-level change to
"remedy or prevent unconstitutional actions."36 ' Many scholars have
suggested that the anticommandeering doctrine simply might not apply
when Congress acts to enforce the Reconstruction Amendments,
because those amendments give Congress special authority to regulate
the states.362

358. See Printz, 521 U.S. at 933 (finding unconstitutional a "mandatory obligation" imposed
by the federal government on state executive officers).
359. See Timbs v. Indiana, 139 S. Ct. 682, 687 (2019) ("With only 'a handful' of exceptions,
this Court has held that the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause incorporates the
protections contained in the Bill of Rights, rendering them applicable to the States." (quoting
McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 765 (2010))).
360. See supra note 357 and accompanying text.
361. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519-20 (1997).
362. See Matthew D. Adler & Seth F. Krcimer, The New Etiquette of Federalism:New York,
Printz, and Yeskey, 1998 SuP. Cr. REV. 71, 123 ("The Court's language in [Pennsylvania
Department of Corrections v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206 (1998)] implies that the anticommandeering
doctrines limit only legislation adopted pursuant to the Commerce Clause, and are inapplicable
to a federal statute appropriately grounded in the Fourteenth Amendment."); Matthew D. Adler,
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On this view, the Reconstruction powers permit Congress to
prevent states from engaging in certain activities and to demand that
states take affirmative steps-as various federal civil rights laws
already require.3 63 Thus, empowered by Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment to remedy and prevent police violations of constitutional
rights, "the federal government could plausibly demand any
enforcement service it wanted from the states,"3 " including by
permitting-and possibly even requiring-a state attorney general to
sue under a federal statute. Congress might not be able to tell a local
sheriff to carry out a firearms background check.36 5 But Congress could
quite plausibly require a state governmental lawyer to litigate to
remedy abusive police practices and require a state legislature to fund
the lawsuit. Of course, as a practical matter, it would be difficult to
enforce any such requirement. The reluctant state attorney general
would have numerous ways to minimize compliance-for example, by
slowing down investigations, filing few cases, writing weak briefs,
seeking adjournments, or assigning low-performing staffers to the
litigation. Likewise, a state legislature has numerous tools at its
disposal to divert a state attorney general from following a federal
requirement to litigate against police departments-for example,
strategically decreasing or delaying funding to the attorney general's
office, enacting new state laws that require heavy enforcement
State Sovereignty and the Anti-Commandeering Cases, 574 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SC.
158,164-65 (2001) (treating the anticommandeering principle as limited to exercises of the Article
I powers); Evan H. Caminker, State Sovereignty and Subordinacy: May Congress Commandeer
State Officers To Implement FederalLaw?, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1001, 1006 n.13 (1995) ("Arguably,
congressional commandeering as a means of exercising its Section Five power to enforce the
Fourteenth Amendment's limitations on state authority ... does not raise the same federalism
issues [as uses of Article I powers], since the Reconstruction Amendments were openly desigued
[sic] to curb state sovereignty."); Daniel A. Farber, Pledging a New Allegiance: An Essay on
Sovereignty andthe New Federalism,75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1133, 1140-41 (2000) ("[E]ven the
anti-commandeering principle may well bow to Congress's enforcement powers under the
Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments, as does the state's sovereign immunity.");
Robert A. Mikos, Can the States Keep Secrets from the Federal Government?, 161 U. PA. L. REV.
103, 171 (2012) ("Congress may commandeer the states pursuant to its powers under the
Reconstruction Era Amendments... . The basis for this exception is straightforward: the
Reconstruction Amendments changed Congress's relationship vis-A-vis the states ..... (footnote
omitted)).
363. Adler & Kreimer, supra note 362, at 124-25; id. at 125-26 ("[M]uch ... legislation-most
prominently Title VII and the voting rights legislation sustained in City of Rome, as well as
municipal responsibility for deliberate indifference to constitutional violations ... requires the
states to take affirmative measures to comply with federal civil rights mandates." (footnotes
omitted)).
364. Mikos, supra note 362, at 171.
365. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997).
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resources, or reducing the number of staffers available to work on
police cases. Constitutional issues aside, it would thus make
considerable practical sense for Congress to provide for standing in a
manner that generates cooperation-not obstruction-on the part of
state governments. The threat of a more coercive approach might itself
encourage states to cooperate. 3 0
CONCLUSION

When former Illinois Attorney General Madigan announced her
lawsuit against the Chicago Police Department, she made a compelling
argument for its necessity: "In the absence of a committed Justice
Department," she explained, the lawsuit was important to "implement
safe and constitutional policing practices."3 67 For decades, the City of
Chicago had failed to provide police officers with the "resources and
support they need to do their job safely and properly." 3 68 Meanwhile,
"Black and brown residents of the city live[d] in fear of criminals and
the police."3 69 And in Chicago "more than half a billion taxpayer
dollars have been used to pay for the consequences of unlawful policing
over the past decade." 370 Chicago's former mayor, Rahm Emanuel,
praised Madigan's decision, stating that he was "proud the attorney
general [was] standing up for our city, for its residents and for our
police officers where the Trump Administration fell flat." 371
State attorneys general should act to protect state residents from
abusive police practices, but the common law doctrine of parenspatriae
is not the right tool for them to do so. Instead, Congress and the state
legislatures should specifically confer standing upon state attorneys
general to bring cases against police departments in federal court.
Statutory standing is essential to ensure that state attorneys general
366. Likewise, there are incentives to minimize the likelihood of state legislatures doing
nothing-simply not adopting any law specifying whether a state attorney general has power to
pursue police misconduct cases in federal court. Congress could specify that the attorney general
of a state will be presumed to have the full powers provided for by the federal statute unless, after
some date, the state itself has adopted a different measure. This would give state legislatures a
window of opportunity to adopt some tailoring measures.
367. Charlie Wojciechowski & Shelby Bremer, Attorney General Madigan Files Lawsuit
Seeking FederalCourt Oversight of Chicago Police Reforms, NBC CmI. (Aug. 29, 2017, 5:24 PM),
https://www.nbcchicago.com/blogs/ward-room/lisa-madigan-lawsuit-justice-department-chicagopolice-reforms-442143973.html [https://perma.cc/M6YX-UXS2].
368. Id.
369. Id. (emphasis added).
370. Id.
371. Ruthhart et al., supra note 33.
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have a reliable basis in law to act and that their efforts comport with
other mechanisms for regulating police departments. With legislative
authority in place, police reform would not need to wait for the sort of
creative lawyering Madigan showed. Instead, empowered to act under
statutory law, state attorneys general around the country would be able
to respond to police violations of rights-and expected to do so. Police
misconduct often seems intractable. With a statutory basis to act, state
attorneys general may hold the key to successful reform.

